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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
l* *GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER, 
trading as Driver's Sales & Service, Defendant, 
v. 
DOROTHY BROOKS, Plaintiff. · 
. PETITION OF GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER FOR WRIT 
OF ERRO~ AND SUPERSEDEAS TO JUDGMENT OF 
CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeills of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as Driver's 
Sales & Service, respectfully represents that she is aggrieved by a 
judgment in the amount of $2,000.00, of the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County, Virginia, entered April 13, 1940, in a certain 
action at law wherein Dorothy· Brooks was plaintiff and this 
petitioner and Bernard Johnson wer'e defendants. A duly certified 
copy of the record in this cause is hereto attached and made a part 
of this petition. 
The aforesaid judgment was entered upon the verdict of a jury 
for the above amount rendered in behalf of the said Dorothy 
Brooks (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) against this 
2* · petitioner (hereinafter referred to as such) and *the said 
Bernard Johnson, .for per.sorial injuries received by the said 
Dorothy Brooks on May 21, 1939, ih an ·automobile collision 'in 
Amher·st County on U. S. · Route 29, between a car in which the 
plaintiff was riding on the fro1it seat as a passenger, proceeding 
southwardly, and a car owned and ·driven by the defendant Johnson , 
proceeding northwardly in the direction of his home at Waynes-
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boro, Virginia. At the time of this collision Johnson was operating 
his car under dealer's license plates or tags the property of petitioner 
which he had borrowed from her for the purpose of bringing his car 
from Bedford, Virginia, to Waynesboro, the home of petitioner 
and the said defendant, in the hope of making a trade. Shortly 
before the accident, according to the testimony of the defendant 
Johnson he had fainted and had lost consciousness and his car, 
proceeding without control, veered across the road and collided 
with the car in which the plaintiff was riding. The apparent 
unconscious condition of the def enclant Johnson prior to the 
moment of collision was corroborated by the plaintiff and several 
other witnesses. 
Upon the trial of this case petitioner proposed to defend on 
the ground that the defendant Johnson had borrowed the dealer's 
license plates and that her only relation with him was that of bailor 
and baileee, imposing uuon petitioner no responsibility for the 
operation of his car by the defendant Johnson; that petitioner had 
no reason to believe that Johnson was in any way unfit or incom-
petent to operate the automobile, and that she was accordingly not 
responsible for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of 
the collision. 
3* *The Trial Court ruled that by reason of the failure of 
the petitioner to file an affidavit under Virginia Code, Sec-
tion 6126, denying that she owned, operated or controlled Johnson's 
car, these defenses were unavailable and that in effect petitioner was 
estopped or precluded from denying that Johnson in operating the 
car was petitioner's servant acting within the scope of his authority. 
Accordingly petitioner was denied an opportunity to introduce 
evidence showing the true facts, her motion to set aside the verdict 
was overruled and judgment entered as aforesaid. 
THE FACTS. 
Petitioner is the owner of an automobile agency and garage in 
the City of ·waynesboro, Virginia, which business she acquired 
under the will of her husband who owned and operated it until 
his death. Since this time the business has been under the control 
and management of Mr. VV. M. Schwab, petitioner's son in law, 
operating it as manager, and of Mr. D. E. Lamb, as superintendent 
and foreman, and petitioner, though the owner of the business, has 
no activity in that regard whatever. 
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According to the testimony of the defendant Johnson (R. p. 64) 
and that of the witnesses Schwab (p. 89) and Lamb (p. 85), 
Johnson, likewise a resident of Waynesboro, owned a Plymouth 
automobile. In early 1939, just before his 1938 license tags ex-
pired, he drove this car to his father's home in Bedford County, 
Virginia, where he was forced to leave it because of some 
4* mechanical defect. In May, 1939, he was *desirous of re-
returning this car to his home and of trying to trade it 
in· before getting 1939 license plates, in view of which he asked 
Mr. Lamb for a loan of dealer's plates. Mr. Lamb suggested that 
he inquire further on the following Saturday so that if plates wer.e 
available Johnson might use them over the weekend without in-
convenience to petitioner. Accordingly Johnson later renewed his 
request which was approved J?y Mr. Schwab, the manager of the 
business, and the licence plates were loaned him for that purpose. _ 
Although it ,ivas in the minds of all parties that when Johnson 
returned his car he would commence negotiations for a trade with 
petitioner, nothing had been agreed upon and the car in question 
was still owned by Johnson. It is pertinent to add that when the 
plates were delivered to Johnson there was no semblance of direc-
tions or instructions given him about the manner or method of 
returning his car from Bedford. (R. pp. 67, 86, 90.) The plates 
were simply lent to him for the purpos~ and a certificate of use, 
required by the Virginia statutes as will hereinafter appear, was 
completed, signed and delivered to him. Neither petitioner nor her 
employees had any further connection with the matter and knew 
nothing of Johnson's return trip or of his accident until informed 
of it on the day after it happened. 
Concerning the details of the collision itself Johnson testified 
( R. p. 65) that as he approached the scene of the collision he did 
not remember seeing the curve on. which it happened nor did he 
remember the impact or anything from then on until after 
S* he regained consciousness. The plaintiff testified on *cross 
examination that she saw Johnson approaching in his car. 
"his head was kinder drooped on his chest hut he was not laying 
on the steering wheel. ... He had both hands on the steering wheel 
when I saw him .... I didn't pay any attention to his eyes but his 
head wasn't up like it ought to have been." (R. p. 47.) Of the 
other three occupants of the plaintiff's car Sallie Hendricks, a 
back seat passenger, testified that she just saw the head of· the 
approaching driver and "he was laying over on ~he side." The 
other back seat passenger first saw the driver as his car veered 
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across the road, and according to her recollection he was then sitting 
up straight. The driver of the ca:r, Mrs. Ruby Tyler, saw the 
approaching car veer to her side of the road but she did not notice 
his position or whether of not he was slumped over. 
A disinterested witness, Dr. J. W. Walters, was driving his own 
car immediately behind that in which the 'plaintiff was riding and 
saw Johnson's car approaching from the opposite direction. This 
witness stated "I saw him coming and his head was· bowed down 
over the wheel and I thought there was something wrong with him 
evidently .... All of a sudden li1s car just jumped and came right 
across the road. . . . "· This witness, a practicing physician, in 
response to further questions, stated that Johnson while still on his 
proper side of the road was slumped down. "I could see him before 
h:e came up. His head was down halfway the wind. shield and 
hanging over the wheel." ( R. pp. 73, 74.) 
It appears from the record, without contradiction, that 
6* *petitioner knew nothing whatever of any infirmity in the 
defendant Johnson, who at that time was licensed to operate 
an automobile, and had no reason to suspect the existence of any 
physical handicap that would prevent his proper operation of an . 
automobile or of any condition that would bring about the 'fainting 
spell or loss of consciousness which unquestionably preceded the 
collision. Whether or not Johnson had been. subject to fainting 
spells so as to make his operation of the automobile a hazardous 
undertaking, and charge him with negligence on that ground, is not 
a question on the present appeal, to which Johnson is not a party. 
The sole questio~ affecting petitioner's liability is whether she had 
any know ledge whatever or reason to believe that Johnson was 
subject to fainting spells which might unexpectedly result in a loss 
of his control of the automobile. The record is barren of any 
suggestion that petitioner, her agents or servants, had any knowl-
edge whatever on this subject, and the two employees, Schwab and 
Lamb, affirmatively denied any such knowledge. 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The present proceeding was by notice of motion brought on 
behalf of the plaintiff Dorothy Brooks. This notice alleges that 
on May 21, 1939, the defendant Driver was a dealer in motor 
vehicles and was the owner and had control of certain dealer's 
license plates. This is followed by a paragraph which alleges 
that the defendant Johnson was physically and mentally unfit to 
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drive an automobile and because of his physical and mental con-
dition it was reasonably probable and likely that he would 
7* have an accident if he undertook to drive. This is followed 
by the further allegation that the defendant Johnson knew 
of his physical and mental condition and that the said Driver 
"through and by her officers and agents, and other-
w~se, knew or but for the want of reasonable. care could 
and would. have known of the said physical and mental 
condition of said Bernard Johnson at and during all the 
times herein mentioned and ref erred to." 
From this statement of facts the notice proceeds to state the 
respective duties of the two defendants, alleging that it thereupon 
became and was the duty of said Driver 
"to refrain ... from handing a set of said license 
plates to said Bernard Johnson and instructing him to 
bring a certain Plymouth automobile from Bedford, 
· Virginia, to Waynesboro, Virginia, as hereinafter set 
forth." 
In a corresponding paragraph the notice alleges the duty of Johnson · 
while in such physical and mental condition to refrain from under-
taking to drive an automobile. 
The breach of duty ascribed to the defendant Driver is thus 
set fcrth: 
"Yet notwithstanding the said duty of the said 
Gertrude Robson Driver ... , by and through her officers 
and agents, she negligently and without the use of ordi-
nary care handed a set of said dealer's license plates to 
said Bernard Johnson and instructed him in effect if not 
literall31, to go to Bedford, Virginia, and put said license 
plates on a certain Plymouth automobile not then owned 
by the said Gertrude Robson Driver, ·which was without 
license plates, and then drive said Plymouth automobile 
to the place of business of said ... Driver in Waynes-
boro, Virginia, without deviating from the most direct 
route from Bedford, Virginia, to Waynesboro, Virginia, 
and without driving said Plymouth automobile for any 
purpose other than to move it from Bedford, Virginia, 
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to Waynesboro, Virginia, in accordance with the afore-
said instructions." (Italics supplied.) 
8* *The notice further alleges that notwithstanding his duty 
Johnson negligently accepted the license plates and agreed 
and undertook to drive the car from Bedford to vVaynesboro, pur-
suant to his said instructions and agreement. · 
The following paragraph contains the legal conclusion that 
"The said Bernard Johnson thereupon became and was 
a bona fide employee and agent of said Driver . . . and 
was . . . acting in connection with and incident to the 
said business of the said Driver as a dealer in motor 
vehicles, and said Plymouth automobile was negligently 
operated as hereinafter set forth in connection with and 
incident to said business of said Driver as a dealer 
in motor vehicles, that is to say, the said Driver con-
, templated and intended . . . that the said Plymouth 
automobile would, pursuant to a certait1 agreement and 
understanding, be traded in on another automobile upon 
its arrival at her said place of business in Waynesboro, 
Virginia, and that the legal title to said automobile pur-
suant to said agreement and understanding would then 
be transferred to said Driver in accordance with the 
form of statute for such case made and provided." 
There then follows a description of the plaintiff's journey along 
the road in Amherst County, which is followed by the statement 
that the defendant "Johnson was then and there likewise driving 
the Plymouth automobile pursuant to his said instructions" over 
said highway in the opposide direction. In the same paragraph 
there is contained the allegation, which we likewise submit is the 
pleadet's: conclusion, in the following language: 
"and the said Gertrude Robson Driver, by and through 
the said Bernard Johnson, then and there operated and 
controlled, and so operated and controlled, at and during 
all the times herein mentioned and ref erred to, the said 
Plymouth automobile, and at and during all the times 
herein mentioned and referred to, the said Bernard · 
9* Johnson was driving *and operating said Plymouth 
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automobile as the agent of said Gertrude Robson Driver, 
pursuant to his said instructions." 
This is followed by a general statement of Johnson's duty in 
the operation of the car, of no pertinence to the present discussion, 
and a further statement of his negliegnt failure to discharge that 
duty, resulting in the collision and the damages and injuries to the 
plaintiff, not necessary for the present discussion. 
It is thus apparent that the case as stated founded petitioner's 
negligence upon her alleged notice that Johnson was unfit physically 
and mentally to operate an automobile, and that this petitioner 
knew, or but for the want of reasonable care could and would have 
known, of. _this condition. The notice then alleges that it became 
·her duty to refrain from handing him a set of license plates and 
instructing him to drive to Vva,ynesboro the automobile not owned 
by the petitioner. 
To this notice of motion petitioner filed a plea of the general 
issue. We, as her counsel read the allegations of this notice as 
stating a case of an unwarranted and unjustifiable bailment of 
driver's plates to a driver of known incompetency, and considering 
the case as thus stated petitioner's counsel, though fully aware of 
the requirements of Virginia Code, Section 6126, found in this 
statement of the case neither the necessity nor occasion for filing 
an affidavit denying ownership, operation or control. Consistently 
with the defense properly and logically demanded by the 
10* allegations of the notice, petitioner's counsel *made his 
opening statement to the jury ( R. pp. 29 et seq.) outlining 
as her defense that she kne,1v nothing of Johnson's incompetency 
and purely as a gratuitous accommodation had loaned him the 
license plates for the purpose of driving his car to Waynesboro. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony which went no further 
than to describe the details of the accident and the improper opera-
tion of Johnson's car, the plaintiff rested. Thereupon counsel for 
petitioner moved to strike this evidence as having -proved no case 
against petitioner, upon which the Court ruled that because of 
petitioner's failure to file the affidavit under Section 6126, petitioner 
must be held to have admitted that Johnson was her agent. The 
Court then overruled the motion and declined to permit the plaintiff. 
to present to the jury the facts outlined above concerning the loan 
of license plates to Johnson for the purposes aforesaid. To this 
ruling of the Court petitioner excepted and thereupon, in the absence 
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of the jury, proved by the witnesses Schwab and Lamb Johnson's 
request for the plates granted by them for his purposes, with no 
'further interest in the return of his car than the possible hope of 
making a trade. Both of these witnesses denied any knowledge of 
Johnson's infirmity or of his disposition to fainting spells, and 
proved further that petitioner, though the owner of the business 
had no active connection with it. and knew nothing of the details of 
the affair in question. 
The defendant Johnson then took the witness stand and related 
the details of borrowing the license plates, over the objection 
11 * of the plaintiff. He denied having made any deal with *pe-
. titioner for the trading in of his car and reaffirmed that his 
request for the use of the tags was solely for his own purposes. 
Being thus deprived of any opportunity of going to the jury 
upon the true facts then existing, petitioner presented to the Court 
her ftt[ther contention that being charged, under the Court's ruling 
on Section 6126, with the relationship of master to the defendant 
Johnson, she could not be liable as such for his unexpected fainting 
and uncontrolled operation of his car unless the evidence further 
shows that she knew, or had reason to believe, at the time she 
theoretically sent Johnson on this mission, that by reason of a prob-
able fainting spell he was unfit to drive a car. To this end and in 
order to avail herself of the lack of evidence to show any such 
knowledge on her part, she tendered to the Court Instruction 'Y 
(R. p. 99) whereby the Court was asked to tell the jury that unless 
petitioner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, on the day of the accident that Johnson was physically or 
mentally unfit to drive a car, they must find for the petitioner. This 
instruction the Court refused and petitioner excepted . 
. Thereupon the case was argued to the jury which returned its 
verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00. Petitioner pre-
sented the usual motion to set aside this verdict for grounds stated 
( R. p. 11), which motion the Court overruled and petitioner ex-
cepted, and judgment was entered upon the verdi~t April 13, 1940. 
12* *ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
I. 
The Trial Court erred in its ruling that in the case as stated and 
alleged by the plaintiff in her notice of motion, Virginia Code, 
·section 6126, was applicable, and erred in denying petitioner 1the 
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right to defend upon the merits or introduce testimony showing 
the actual relationship of the parties. · 
This assignment also covers the action of the Court in overruling 
the motions of petitioner to strike the plaintiff's evidence, made at 
the conclusion of the plaintiff's case and at the conclusion of all 
testimony, and the refusal of the Court to permit petitioner to file 
the affidavit or·avail herself of the true facts concerning the situa-
tion as revealed by the evidence of the defendant Johnson, and the 
action of the Court in overruling petitioner's motion t9 set aside 
the verdict and· enter up a final judgment in her behalf. 
II. 
The Court erred in refusing Petitioner's Instruction Y. 
ARGUMENT. 
The contentions of the petitioner herein may be summa~ized as 
follows: 
· ( 1) The allegations of the notice of motion and the actual facts 
of the transaction as developed by the testimony neither justify nor 
demand the application of Virginia Code, Section 6126, and 
13* the Trial Court erred in holding it applicable *and excluding 
evidence to show that petitioner's only connection with the 
case was in lending dealer's license plates to Johnson for the opera-
tion of his own car on his own business. 
(2) The Virginia statute, Code section 2154(67), governing 
the use of dealer's license plates, did not imppse liability upon the 
lender of such plates for the negligence of a borrower in the 
absence of proof of any causal connection between the bailment of 
these plates and the injuries complained of by the plaintiff. 
( 3) Even assuming that under Code Section 6126 petitioner and 
Johnson occupied -the relationship of master and servant or prin-
cipal and agent, petitioner would not be liable for the negligent ' 
acts of Johnson, due to the lack of any knowledge of Johnson 
incompetency in the operation of an automobile. 
These propositions will be considered in their order. 
1. Virginia Code Section 6126 is Not Applicable. 
Section 6126, above referred to, reads as follows: 
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"When proof of ownership, etc. unnecessary unless 
affidavit is filed.-\Vhere a bill, declaration, or other 
pleading alleges that any person or ~orporation, at a 
stated time, owned, operated or controlled any property 
or instrumentality, no proof of the fact alleged shall be 
required unless an affidavit be _filed with the ple~ding 
putting it in issue, denying specifically and with particu-
larity that such property or instrumentality vrns, at the 
time alleged, so owned, operated, or controlled." 
14* *It will be noted that the mandate of this statute con-
cerns proof of the "fact alleged." \"!\Te submit as a basic 
principle for a consideration of the present assignment and the 
requirements of this statute that the propriety and necessity for 
filing an affidavit are to be determined by the allega.tions of fact 
contained in the pleadings and not froni the pleader's conclusions. 
Otherwise expressed, in order to determine the necessity for the 
designated affidavit nothing but the factual allegations of the plead-
ing should be taken into account. It must be stripped of superfluous 
statements and conclusions and account taken of the allegations of 
fact and nothing else. To this extent the same rules and considera-
tions govern the sufficiency, n1ateriality and relevancy of the alle-
gations as obtain in a consideration of these qualifications upon 
demurrer, wherein the pleading is tested upon a concession of the 
truth of the facts alleged. In such a case the question is not what 
conclusions of law the pleader may have drawn by way of creating 
relationships or establishing duties, but concerns the allegations of 
fact from which the law supplies the duties and answers the ques-
tion whether the ~uty is sufficiently alleged so that if proven the 
law supplies the conclusion of liability. This Court has more than 
once held that the sufficiency of any pleading is to be tested by the 
allegations of fact. 
In the case of Ha)'nor v. Haynor, 112 Va. 123, the question 
, concerned the propriety of overruling a demurrer to a bill for 
divorce. The Court noted the inferences of the bill "based 
15 * on *the pleader's conclusions from . unrevealed facts" and 
· in considering the sufficiency of the bill quoted from Trumbo 
v. Fulk, 103 Va. 73, as follows: 
"A demurrer admits as true all facts which are prop-
erly pleaded, but does not admit the conclusions of law 
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from these facts which the pleader may have seen fit to 
introduce." 
The Court quoted from a Calif ~rnia case as follows : 
"A conclusion of law in a pleading, so far as it is 
correct, is useless, and where erroneous is worse than 
useless, and in either case it 1.mll be treated as if no't 
alleged in considering objections to the pleading raised 
by demurrer." ( Italics supplied.) 
In the case of Co.i· v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, a plea was held 
insufficient 
"because it violates the rule against the allegation of 
mere conclusions of law, and does not allege the facts' 
from which those conclusions are sought to be drawn 
with sufficient d·etail and certainty to apprise the opposite 
party of the nature of the defense and to enable the court 
upon the facts admitted or found to decide whether the 
matter relied on constituted a valid claim to the relief 
sought." 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Portsmouth Gas Co., 132 Va. 
480, this Court on appeal considered the demurrability of a writ of 
quo warranto filed by the city against the gas company which con-
tained certain statements concerning the rights of the company to 
the use of streets and the surrender of its charter and franchises. 
The demurrer was sustained by the trial court and upon appeal 
this Court by Kelly, P. affirmed that finding as follows: 
"The legal effect of the demurrer was to admit the 
facts but not the conclusions of law stated in the infor-
mation, and upon the facts as alleged we are of opinion 
that the demurrer was properly sustained." (Italics 
sµpplied. 
16* *Under the foregoing holdings of this Court the suffici-
ency of a case stated in a pleading, when tested by demurrer, 
is measured by its allegations of fact. Similarly, in the case at bar, 
the sufficiency of an alleged case to render this section of the Code 
, applicable is to be tested by the facts alleged, stripped of the. plead-
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er's conclusions. This statute dispenses with "proof of the facts 
alleged," by which statement the Legislature is held to have meant, 
it is said, allegations of fact, and not conclusions of law. 
This was the holding of the Court of Appeals of Georgia in the 
case of HOJYris v. Whitehall Che1.,orolet Co. (December, 1936), 189 
S. E. 392, a common law action for damages in which a demurrer 
to a petition was sustained. The motion contained allegations that 
the defendant owned a car which struck the plaintiff when the car 
driven by an agent of the defendant ran through a street line with-
out warning and with improper brakes. It further alleged that the 
defendant company owned the car and instructed the qperator to 
drive it "pursuant to an attempt or plan of said company to sell 
said automobile," and that the then operator, at the time of the 
collision, was driving said automobile pursuant to and under the 
.instructions of" the defendant company. Thi.s petition was amended 
so as to include the allegation that the driver was the agent of the 
defendant company and that the negligence of the company's agent 
caused the injury complained of. The defendant demurred to the 
petition on the grounds that it set forth no cause of action 
17* and showed that the individual defendant *was not an agent 
of the company but its bailee: The trial court sustained the 
demurrer, which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed. · 
In passing upon the relationship existing between the company 
and the driver the Court quoted with approval from the case of 
Hamp v. Universal Auto Co., 173 Wash. 585, 24 Pac. (2d), 77, 
as follows: 
"The recital in the complaint that Mr. Allen ( the 
prospective purchaser) was the agent and employee of 
the Auto Company was a mere conclusion, not the the 
allegation of a fact or inference that could reasonably be 
draum from the facts pleaded, and was, therefore, not 
admitted by the demurrer. The fact that the owner of 
the automobile delivered it to Mr. Allen as a prospective 
purchaser does not justify the imputation to the owner 
of Allen's negligence while driving it for demonstration 
purposes." ( Italics supplied.) · 
Measured by the foregoing rules and requirements the notice in 
this case alleges as facts that the petitioner knowing of Johnson's 
unfitness to drive a car wrongfully handed him a set of license 
plates and instructed him to operate a car which the defend~nt did 
-- ------~ -----------------
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not own. These instructions to operate the car were qualified to 
the extent that they do not rise to the dign_ity of an order given by 
a master to a servant, the language being that petitioner "instructed 
· him in effect, if not literally" to drive the car. There is no allegation 
that Johnson was in petitioner's employ or that any relationship 
existed between them that would justify the legal conclusion that 
such relationship existed. On the contrary, the case as stated is one 
of a bailment of plates to a person of known unfitness. 
18* Based on the facts *alleged the case as stated led petitioner 
to believe that she must prepare to defend a case of lending 
license plates to a person of known unfitness. 
It might be pertinent to add at this point that these allegations, 
as compared with the testimony actually produced in the case, 
point to the ·unmistakable conclusion that plaintiff's atttorney knew 
at the time of bringing this suit the pertinent facts in the case. It 
appears from the transcript (p. 81) that Mr. Ward knew of the loan 
of the license tags and that his investigation of the facts had pro-
ceeded to the point where he had convinced himself that he could 
not prove that this defendant knew of Johnson's incompetence. 
He heard the opening statement made by counsel for this d~fendant, 
showing the line of testimony intended to be adduced, all of which 
we submit was fulfilled by the testimony of Johnson, Lamb and 
Schwab. We mention this by way of stating our own conclusion 
that this defendant's offer to prove that Johnson borrowed license 
plates for use on Johnson's own car came as no surprise to the 
plaintiff or her attorney, who, in our opinion, knew the facts as 
fully as did the defendant. 
The materiality of the question of surprise will appear from the 
Virginia authorities dealing with this section of the Code set forth 
below. 
We further submit that in view of the allegations of the notice, 
of the plaintiff's knowledge of the facts and the true relation exist-
ing between this defendant and Johnson, and of the opening 
19'* statement made by counsel for this defendant, *plaintiff's 
attorney had no right, if thus taken by surprise, to permit 
the trial to proceed without the affidavit claimed by the plaintiff to 
be necessary, and allow the provisions of Section 6126 to become 
an instrument "to trap the unwary." We submit that there was 
then impo~ed upon him the positive duty to raise the question 
whether the defense as outlined by defendant's counsel was ad-
missible and if so, to point out that such a defense came as a 
surprise to him and operated to his disadvantage. If then he knew 
. ' 
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of his inability to prove a different state of facts he would not be 
hurt by a showing of the true situation, but if this offer of proof 
in any way became prejudicial to a presentation of the true facts, 
then a continuance was in order. This conclusion is; we submit, 
likewise supported by the Virginia cases hereinafter alluded to. 
Our study of the several decisions of this Court interpreting this 
statute convinces us that the Court views it as an expedient means 
of supplying proof of those essentials to recovering in a meritorious 
case which lie peculiarly within the knowledge of a defendant who 
by his silence might defeat justice and prevent recovery. Such are 
the cases of Green v. Limi, 147 Va. 392, and Vandergrift v. 
Somrnerall, 158 Va. 725. On the other hand, we are equally 
impressed with the Court's conclusion that the statute is not to be 
given the effect of excluding the truth in the defense of a case 
- where the plaintiff has no moral claim against the defendant and 
where a recovery would obviously be a miscarriage of justice. 
20* In support of this latter conclusion 'we cite first *the case of 
Carlton v. Martin, 160 Va. 149. This case is so strikingly 
in point that we have reviewed the record and brief which for the 
assistance of the Court we present at some length. 
This was a suit instituted by · notice of motion against three 
defendants, J. J. Martin, Eva T. Martin and Douglas Dodson, 
seeking recovery for injuries inflicted by an automobile upon the 
infant plaintiff alighting from a school bus. The notice charges 
that this child w~s crossing the road, 
"when a certain automobile which ,,vas then and there 
being driven by tlte said defendants ..... met, overtook 
or passed the plaintiff, and that upon this meeting, over-
taking or passing the plaintiff the said def end ants then 
and there· did negligently and recklessly run said auto-
mobile upon and against the plaintiff . . . ." ( Italics 
supplied.) 
The bill of particulars filed at the request of the defendants fur-
ther alleges that "the defendants named in the plaintiff's notice of 
motion drove the automobile then owned, controlled or opera~ed by 
them, at the point of the collision described in said notice of motion 
negligently" etc. ( Italics supplied) ; that "said defendants at the 
point of said collision failed to drive the said automobile" in a 
careful and prudent manner, but "drove the said automobile upon 
the highway at such a rate of spe~d as to endanger the Ii fe, 
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limb and property" of the plaintiff, and in eight other respects drove 
said automobile negligently. To this notice of motion the defend-
ants filed a plea of the general issue, "that they are not guilty of 
the said trespass above laid to their charge, or any part thereof, in 
manner and form as the said plaintiff hath above complained, and 
of this the said defendants put themselves upon the country." There 
was also filed a statement of contributory negligence. 
21 * *Upon the trial testimony was adduced showing the neg-
ligent operation of the car which was being driven by Dodson 
accompanied by Mr. Martin and a colored man. When the plaintiff 
rested the defendants moved to exclude the evidence of the plaintiff 
on the ground that no actionable negligence had been pr.9ved, which 
motion was overruled, and a motion was then made to exclude the . 
evidence and dismiss the case as to Mrs. Eva Martin on the ground 
that it had not been shown that she owned the car, that it was 
operated by her agents, or that she had any control over it and was 
in any way concerned. This motion was overruled on the ground 
that she was required by Section 6126 to file an affidavit denying 
agency or ownership, and that such affidavit had not been· filed, 
and to this ruling there was exception. 
Mr. J. J. Martin then proved that he was the owner of the car, 
that he was not acting as the agent for Mrs. Martin and that she 
had no control over the car or anything to do with it. This evi-
dence the Court excluded on the ground of irrelevancy since Mrs. 
Martin had failed to file the affidavit required by statute, to which 
ruling Mrs. Martin excepted on the ground that "it was not neces-
sary to file such affidavit under the circumstances of the case and 
under the allegations of the declaration." 
At the conclusion of defendants' evidence defendants rested and 
the Court adjourned until the next day. On the following morning 
Mrs. Martin, by counsel, stated that before calling another witness, 
he desired to file an affidavit on behalf of Mrs. Martin deny-
22* iny that she owned the car or that it was being *operated by 
her agent, or that she had any control whatever over it. 
Counsel further stated that on the previous afternoon he had notified 
plaintitf's counsel of his intention to file the affidavit and had 
notified him to have his witnesses present to testify to Mrs. Martin's 
ownership, operation or control of the car. Plaintiff's counsel 
objected to the filing of the affidavit on the ground that material 
witnesses on the question of ownership had on the preceding day 
left the court and could not be reached, and that to "force the 
plaintiff into a trial on this issue would operate as an injustice 
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upon her and that ,the motion comes too late and is not in accord-
ance with Section 6126." ( Italics supplied.) The Court refused 
to allow the affidavit to be filed, to which an exception was noted 
for Mrs. Martin on the ground that "under the ruling of the Court 
the filing of the affidavit was necessary in order to do justice to 
Mrs. Martin, and that no harm would be clone t.o the plaintiff 
except to prevent her from recovering a judgment against the 
defendant who was in nowise liable." 
After the jury had been instructed they returned a verdict against 
all three defendants, which verdict the Court set aside upon their. 
motion, and thereupon the plaintiff appealed. Counsel for Mrs. 
Martin assigned cross error to the action of the trial court, on the 
ground that the Court erred in excluding the evidence that Mrs. 
Martin had no control over the car or anything to do with the 
matter, and upon the further ground that the Court erred in refus-
ing to permit the affidavit of Mrs. Martin denying ownership, 
operation or control. 
23* *The Court of Appeals, speaking by Gregory, J., reversed 
the trial court upon the ground that the defendant's auto-
mobile had been negligently operated, thereby establishing a prece-
dent in connection with the operation of a school bus. The. negli-
gence thus found was restricted to the defendant J. J. Martin and 
Dodson and was held to have no application to Mrs. Martin whose 
cross assignments of error must be considered. 
After quoting th.e statute the Court observed as follows: 
· "It is at once apparent that for the statute to apply, 
the 'bill, cleclaration or other pleading' must allege that 
the property or instrumentality was 'owned, operated, or 
controlled' by 'any person or corporation.' If the bill, 
declaration or other pleading contains no such allegation, 
no affidavit denying ownership, operation or control is 
necessary or required. 
The notice filed in the present case contained no specific 
allegation that Mrs. Eva T. Martin owned, operated or 
c~ntrolled the automobile involved here and consequently 
it was entirely proper for her counsel to introduce evi-
dence showing that she did not own, operate or control 
the said automobile. The court erroneously excluded this 
line of testimony which has been previously referred to. 
Counsel for Mrs. Martin has this to say regarding the 
statute: 'The purpose of the legislature should not be 
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ignored. That purpose was to make it unnecessary to 
prove ownership or agency where ownership or agency 
is alleged, unless an affidavit is filed putting the matter in 
issue. The statute is a wise one, but it may not be in-
voked unless proper allegations are made. It was not the 
purpose of the statute to catch the unwary, but to ·obviate 
the necessity of proving matter which rests peculiarly 
in the possession of the defendants.' Counsel's observa-
tion, in our judgment, clearly expresses the correct view. 
The uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that Mrs. 
Martin was not the owner or operator of the automobile. 
It shows that she had no control of it and that the 
operators of it were not her agents and it also shows that 
24* she was not riding in it at the time. *It would be a 
manifest injustice to require her to respond in damages 
for the injury here involved, when every fact in the case 
shows conclusively tha,t she was, in no sense, liable or 
responsible for it. It is inconceivable that the legislature 
through the statutory enactment intended that such a 
result would follow. It was· never intended that' the 
statute in question would have any application to such 
facts as appear in this case in relation to Mrs. Martin. 
Under the facts and circumstances here no liability could 
rest upon her for the injuries to the plaintiff in error. 
This view of the case eliminates the necessity of any 
discussion of cross-assignment of error number two." 
It is noticeable that the Court based its construction of Section 
6126 upon the first assignment of cross error, namely, that the 
trial court erred in excluding the evidence showing that Mrs. Martin 
had no control over the car, and finding this sufficient to relieve 
Mrs. Martin of any responsibility, found it unnecessary to con-
sider the second assignment of cross error, the refusal of the trial 
court to permit the affidavit to be filed. The Court accordingly 
reinstated the verdict against the two occupants of the car, but 
specifically held that under the facts of the case the statute had no 
application and that the true situation should have been admitted. 
May it be noted that the declaration in this case alleged that the 
defendants, including Mrs. Martin, operated the automobile, that 
the defendants negligently inflicted the ·injuries complained :of, and 
in the bill of particulars that the def end ants drove the automobile 
then owned, controlled or operated by them. 
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It is also interesting to note that the plaintiff filed a pe-
25* tition for a rehearing, assigning as error the action of *the 
Court of Appeals in its finding in favor ·of Mrs. Martin. 
This petition recites Green v. Lum and Vandergrift v. SumnieraU, 
supra. Despite the filing of the petition the Court of Appeals saw 
fit to take no action in the premises, and its opinion stands as the 
final judgn1ent in that case. 
In the case of Loitgh v. Lyon., 168 Va. 136, Lough brought a 
notice of motion alleging, in effect, that he was employed by Lyon 
to perfomi certain work upon a building owned by defendant which 
failed in its duty to furnish him a safe place to work. The jury 
returned a verdict for the defendant from which plaintiff appealed. 
Error was assigned upon the ground that the Court permitted the 
defendant, after. the jury was sworn, to make an affidavit to its plea 
previously filed and to introduce evidence in support of the plea. 
The Court noted the allegations of the notice from which it quoted, 
to the effect that the plaintiff was working for the defendant within 
the scope of his employment upon a building under construction 
and "owned and/ or constructed under your control" when a scaffold 
constructed by defendant's agents and servants within the scope of 
their employment and under defendant's direction broke and in-
flicted upon the plaintiff the injuries complained of. The defendant 
filed a plea denying that the plaintiff was working for defendant or 
under his control, which the Court construed as denying that the 
relation of master and servant existed, that it was constructed by 
defendant's agents, or was constructed for the use of the 
26* plaintiff, *or was insufficiently constructed. The ownership 
of the building and scaffold was not put in issue, but the 
Court Appeals noted that to recover the plaintiff must prove ( 1) 
that the relation between defendant and plaintiff was that of master 
and servant, and ( 2) that the master had breached that duty. 
Passing· upon the necessity for the filing of an affidavit under 
Code, 6126, the Court said, relying upon Carlton v. Martin, supra, 
as to the purpose of the statute: 
"The provisions of Code, Section 6126, do not require 
an affidavit to a plea putting such averments in issue. 
The statute is remedial and its purpose is to relieve the 
plaintiff of proving more or less formal matters and like 
Code, Section 6125, it is designed to aid plaintiffs to con-
centrate their proof upon the real merits of the cpntro-
versy without having to be prepared at the time of trial 
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to prove the genuineness of the signature to writings in 
the one instance· ( Section 6125) or the ownership or 
control of instrumentalities in the other (6126) unless 
such matters are put in issue by the sworn plea." 
The Court further noted that even if it be held that the Section 
applies, and that the allegations in the notice of motion required 
the affidavit, the plaintiff has had one fair trial on the merits. At 
this point the Court noted that the question of admissibility of 
evidence under the unsworn plea, to the effect that plaintiff was an 
independent contractor and not a servant of defendant, arose while 
defendant's counsel was making his opening statement to the jury. 
After the objection was fully argued, the Court over protest of the 
plaintiff allowed the defendant to swear to the plea, the 
27* Court then stating to *the plaintiff that if he was not pre-
pared to meet the issue as raised by the plea as amended the 
.case would be continued. The plaintiff elected to proceed with the 
trial. The Court then alluded to Code, Section 6104, reading thus: 
"In any suit, action, motion or other proceeding here-
after instituted the court may at any time in furtherance 
of justice and upon such terms as it linay deem best 
permit any pleading to be amended or material supple-
mental matter be set forth in an amended or supplemental 
pleading. The court shall at every stage of the pro-
ceeding disregard any error or defect which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If substantial -
amendment is made in pursuance of this section the court 
shall make such order as to continuance and costs as shall 
seem fair and just." 
Noting that these statutory provtstons are somewhat broader 
than the practice approved by ~he Court in cited cases, allowing 
amendment of pleadings, the Court alluded to· the case of Dean v. 
Dean, 122 Va. 513, which had to do with Section 6127 noted above. 
In that case there was but a single exception growing out of the 
fact that the defendant failed to file a proper affidavit denying 
partnership and that after all the eilidence was in the trial court 
permitted the defendant, over the objection of the plaintiff, to file 
the affidavit. The Court then quoted with approval the following 
language of Judge Prentis in that case : 
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"If the plaintiff had indicated to the court that he had 
been put in a disailvantageoits position or taken by su,r-
prise and had asked the court for a continuance, the court 
would doubtless have continued the case on his motion. 
Certainly this should have been done, if it appeared that 
28* he had been taken by *surprise. Instead of doing this, 
however, he went on with the trial contenting himself 
with a mere exception to the action of the court in allow-
ing the affidavit to be filed and took his chances before 
the jury upon the evidence submitted. Under these cir-
cumstances, and because none of the evidence is certified 
so that this court has no fact sho1.cting that his rights 
have been injuriously affected, it is clear that the judg-
ment in favor of the defendant upon the verdict should 
be affirmed." (Italics supplied.) 
Adjudicating the case before it upon these principles, the Court. 
of Appeals had no hesitation in affirming the decision of the court 
below, thereby approving the action of the trial court in permitting 
the filing of the affidavit during the trial. 
From our reading of the foregoing cases we are impressed by a 
tendency on the part of the Court of Appeals to get away from a 
rigid enforcement of this statutory provision, where such an en-
forcement would as noted enable the plaintiff to recover upon a 
stated case when the facts show that in justice the plaintiff has no 
claim, legally or morally, to ask the defendant for damages. In the 
last case reviewed, Loitgh v. Lyon, the action of the trial court in 
permitting the filing of the affidavit after the commencement of the 
trial was approved and the Court cited in support of its conclusion 
the case of Dea.11 v. Dean, supra, wherein such an affidavit was filed 
after all the eiidence wa.s in. In the case of Loitgli v. L·yon the 
Court's desire to do justice is shown by its citation of Section 
6104 which authorizes the trial court to permit amendment "at 
any time in furtherance of justice," upon such terms as it may 
deem just. 
-29* *The case of Carlton v. Martin, supra, is strikingly like 
the case at bar and we submit is entirely in point. In that 
case the motion to permit the filing of the affidavit was not made 
until the conclusion of the defendant's testimony. Meanwhile, the 
Court on motion of the plaintiff had excluded testimony offered by 
defendant to the effect that Mrs. Martin neither ,owned, operated 
nor controlled the car. Thus at the conclusion of the trial the case 
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stood in exactly the position of the case at bar, though the present 
record contains the true· facts concerning the question of operation 
and control, evidence of which was excluded from the jury. 
It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals in the Carlton 
case decided it in favor of Mrs. Martin upon the first of the two 
assignments of cross error, namely, that the Court erred in exclud-
ing the evidence that Mrs. Martin had no control over the car, did 
not own it and had nothing to do with its operation. 
The case of Lough v. Lyon suggests the question whether the 
filing of the affidavit, if permitted, would have resulted in any way 
prejudicial to the claim of the plaintiff, or would have changed the 
presentation of his case, or would even have resulted in the neces-
sity for a continuance for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to 
. adduce further proof. In the cast at bar, as has been noted, the 
defendant's counsel in his opening statement told the Court 
30* and the Jury the exact situation which *he expected to 
develop, namel)', that Johnson had borrowed license plates 
from this defendant to enable Johnson to bring his own car from 
Bedford to Waynesboro. If this statement of proposed defense 
came as a surprise to plaintiff's counsel, who knew at that stage 
that no affidavit had been filed, it might have been proper for him 
at that time to have raised the question, as was done in Lough v. 
Lyon, but he did not see fit to do so, though knowing perhaps of 
his intention to rely upon Code, 6126, to prevent the introduction 
of the testimony necessary to support the defenses outlined in the 
opening statement. We submit further that th~ facts which def end-
ant attempted to introduce in support of this defense came as no 
surprise to plaintiff's counsel. Vv e have noted above the reference 
to the record which shows the extent of .. his knowledge that this 
defendant knew nothing of Johnson's incompetency. We submit, 
therefore, that had the affidavit been filed the plaintiff's case would 
have been no stronger, nor would any evidence have been produced 
which would tend to impose any liability upon this de'fendant for 
lending to Johnson the license_plates under which Johnson's car was 
operated at the time of the accident. 1 
Another aspect of the Trial Court's ruling on Code, 6126, is 
included in this assignment of error, of sufficient import to justify 
brief discussion. As noted above, the Court excluded from the 
Jury the testimony of petitioner's witnesses Lamb and Schwab 
showing petitioner's loan of license plates ( R. pp. 87, 90). 
31 * The defendant Johnson, who had likewise filed a plea of the 
general issue to the plaintiff's allegations, undertook tp show 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
the true facts, to which the plaintiff objected, but did not except to 
the Court's ruling in admitting the evidence ( R. pp. 63, 64). 
Under these facts it is submitted that in no aspect of the matter 
or under no construction of Code Section 6126 could that statute 
be held to justify the Court in excluding Johnson's testimony that 
he owned the car which inflicted the injuries and was operating it 
on his own business. The truth of these facts made it entirely im-
possible for him by affidavit to deny that he owned, operated or 
controlled the car which admittedly he both owned, operated and 
controlled. Obviously the statute could not apply to him nor operate 
to exclude his testimony on these subjects, and an objection to the 
testimony based solely on the ground that he filed no affidavit must 
necessarily be overruled. There was no objection to his testimony 
on other grounds and to this extent the testimony of Johnson re-
vealing petitioner's non-liability, may be said to have been admitted 
without legal objection and was therefore available to petitioner as 
a defense. It having thus been shown by uncontradicted evidence 
that the car inflicting the injury was neither owned ndr operated by 
your petitioner nor controlled by her, but was owned by Johnson 
and operated on his business, a recovery against petitioner could 
hardly stand. 
Under the foregoing considerations it is submitted that 
32* *the Trial Court erred in its several rulings under Section 
6126. 
2. The Use of Dealer's License Plates.. 
If as we have shown above, the case as stated by the plaintiff 
in her notice of motion was not such as to render Section 6126 
applicable and did not r~quire the filing of an affidavit by petitioner, 
then it is respectfully submitted that under the facts as proven by 
petitioner, without contradiction, there could have been no legal 
liability upon petitioner to the plaintiff for the loan of t.he dealer's 
plates. 
The use of dealer's license tags is governed by Virginia Code 
Section 2154(69) which provides that a dealer in motor vehicles, 
owning and operating any motor vehicle upon any highway, in lieu 
of registering each such motor vehicle, may obtain and attach ,to 
each such vehicle one or duplicate license plates bearing a dis-
tinctive number together with the word "dealer." This act provides 
that any plate so issued may during the calendar year. for which 
issued be transferred from one motor vehicle to another, used or 
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operated by such dclacr, who shall keep a written record of the 
vehicle, open to inspection by the Motor Vehicle Department. The 
statute further provides: 
"Such dealer's license plates shall be used only on 
motor vehicles . . . which when opera~ed on the high-
ways of this state are operated in connection with their 
business; provided that dealer's tags shall not be used on 
motor vehicles for the use or operation of which dealers 
charge or receive compensation .... 
33* *Provided, however, a dealer may permit such tags to 
be used in the operation of a motor vehicle ... by a bona 
fide prospective purchaser thereof where such dealer 
issues to such prospective purchaser a certificate on forms 
provided by the division, a copy of which shall be retained 
by such dealer and open at all times to the inspection of 
the . . . . di vision." 
This paragraph provides that the certificate last mentioned shall 
show its elate, the person to whom issued, the motor number, and 
th~ dealer's license number, and shall be "in the immediate posses-
sion of the person operating such vehicle at all times while so 
operating same," and shall entitle such person to operate only on the 
day mentioned thereon. 
Section 2154(82) specifying the registration fees to be paid 
include in subsection ( e) the following provision : 
"It shall be unlawful for any such manufacturer, 
dealer, agent or any other person to use such number 
plates other than on motor vehicles . . . used in connec-
tion with their business; ... and any violation of this 
section shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
twenty-five dollars ($25.00) and not more than one 
hundred dollars ($100.00)." 
The permission expressly recognized and given by the aforesaid 
statute contemplates the use of dealer's plates on motor vehicles 
operated in connection with the dealer's business, subject to 
the qualification that the dealer may permit the plates to be used in 
the operation of a motor vehicle by a bona fide purchaser thereof. It 
will further be noted that this law prescribes its own penalty for 
violation, namely, that when such plates are used on motor ~ehicles 
I 
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otherwise than in connection with the dealer's business, in-
34* eluding an operation by a prospective purchaser of a *motor 
vehicle, the dealer becomes subject to fine as therein pre-
scribed. Any provision expressly or by implication imposing civil 
liability upon the dealer for injuries resulting from such operation 
is conspicuously. absent. · 
Upon familiar principles of statutory construction a dealer who 
suffers or permits the use of his automobile,., bearing license plates, 
for the personal purposes of the driver and not in connection with 
the dealer's business, or in violation of this statute, would of 
course be subject to the penalty prescribed by it and would also be 
liable civilly for such, damages as res1,1,lt directly from the un-
authorized act. Similarly a dealer permitting the use of his dealer's 
plates unaccompanied by the certificate prescribed for such per-
mitted use would likewise infringe the provisions of the statute and 
in addition to the fine therein prescribed might be liable civilly for 
injuries proximately resulting from such unauthorized use of such 
plates. But nowhere does it appear that the Legislature intended to 
impose civil liability upon a dealer who permits unauthorized use 
of his dealer's plates for damages which result solely from the neg-
ligent operation of an automobile by the third person, and to which 
the unlawful use of the plates in no way contributed. 
In direct contrast to this situation, wherein the mention of civil 
liability ·is entirely absent, is the statutory provision governing the 
use of an automobile by a minor under the age of sixteen· years. 
Section 2154( 178) provides that the Division shall not issue 
35* an operator's license on the application of any *minor under 
the age of eighteen years unless the application is signed by 
the father of the applicant, and provides in Section 2154( 190) 
that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or permitting a minor 
under the age of sixteen years who is not permitted by law to drive 
such vehicle, and any person who gives or- furnishes a motor vehicle, 
shall be jointly or severally liable with such minor for any damages 
caused by such minor in driving such vehicle. In such a case ~by 
express provision of law the owner of a motor vehicle who permits 
the minor to drive it or who gives or furnishes it to the minor is 
liable civilly for any damages caused by the minor's negligence. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that in the absence of a 
legislative declaration that civil responsibility upon the dealer should 
be consequent upon his allowing a third person to use the dealer's 
plates upon the third person's car, or to use the dealer's car with 
attached dealer's plates otherwise than as a prospective purchaser 
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thereof, the Legislature did not intend that civil liability should 
follow, in the absence of causal connection. But entirely aside from 
the matter of statutory construction, there must be causal connec-
tion between the unauthorized use of the dealer's plates and. the. 
injury which the plaintiff alleges and proves has resulted proxi-
mately and consequentially from such statutory breach. 
Jn the case of Shoemaker v. Andrf!'los, 154 Va. 170, the plain-
tiff alleged as negligence the defendant's operation of his 
36* *motor vehicle without the lights required by Acts 1926, 
C1!apter 474. The evidence clearly revealed that there was 
·sufficient daylight at the time to enable the witnesses to see all 
that happened. Passing upon the question whether the defendant's 
failure in this respect had any causal connection with the accident 
the Court said: 
"It is manifest from the testimony that. the failure to 
have lights did not contribute in any way to the plaintiff's 
injuries. It can hardly be doubted that there must be 
some connection between the injury and the failure to 
observe such statutory requirements as a contributing 
ca:use of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff." 
We find no case in Virginia construing these sections of the 
statute which, so far as we can learn, have not brought before this 
Court the situation now presented. We find that in other States 
where similar statutes governing the use of dealer's plates have been 
enacted, the courts have uniformly held that an -automobile dealer 
who permits dealer's plates to be ,used by a third person, in violation 
of a statute contemplating the use of such plates for demonstration 
{mrposes only, is not liable tor injuries which do not proximately 
result from such unlawful conduct. This question is the subject of 
an annotation in 86 A. L. R., page 236, appended to the case of 
Worsham. Buick Co. v. Isaacs (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1932), 51 S. W. (2d); 
277. In that case action was brought for the death of a pede~trian 
on Sunday, who was struck by an automobile owned by the Buick 
Co. and operated by its service superintendent who drove the car 
while drunk at an excessive speed through an intersection in 
37* Dallas. The statute governing the use of dealer's *plates 
defined a dealer as any person engaged in the business of 
selling automobiles who runs them upon the public highways 
for demonstration for the purposes of sale. The act further pro-
vided that it "shall not be construed as permitting the use of a 
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dealer's license or number plate on any vehicle owned or used by 
such a dealer for any other purpose than demonstration• for the 
purpose of sale." The evidence showed that the employee asked 
the .company for permission to use the automobile, the property of 
the company, on the following day (Sunday), for his personal use, 
and that he was so using it when the collision occurred, at which 
time the car bore the dealer's plates. 
The Court concluded that the use of the dealer's license plates 
on its own car when operated on the public highway other than for 
demonstration purposes is impliedly prohibited and is, ,therefore, 
unlawful, but this fact the Court found insufficient to impose civil 
liability upon the dealer for such use. · 
"It can hardly be doubted that where the dealer per-
mits his license plates to be used on an automobile in 
violation of this statute he creates a situation calculated 
to mislead third persons into assuming that the auto-
mobile is being operated for the dealer, for demonstra-
tion purposes. In such a case if the third person in 
reliance on such assumption is misled into some action 
which exposes him to injury the dealer will be estopped 
to deny that the automobile was being operated by his 
authorized agent for demonstration purposes. The con-
duct of the dealer does' not, however, constitute a basis 
for estoppel, even though such conduct be violative of 
statutory law, unless somebody is thereby misled into ex-
posing himself to injury. ( Citing authorities.) Estoppel 
38* is never *employed as a means of inflicting punishment 
for an unlawful or wrongful act. Notwithstanding the 
conduct of the motor company, in the respects mentioned, 
is made a crime by provision of our Penal Code, an 
estoppel does not arise. Plainly if Isaacs had survived 
he could not have invoked an estoppel against a showing 
that the motor company was not responsible for the neg-
ligent acts of Simpson; for it could not be said of course 
that Isaacs suffered injury in relying upon the ostensible 
purpose for which the automobile was being operated by 
Simpson." 
In disposing of the further question certified to it and denying 
that the motor company is charged as a matter of law with the 
negligent operation of the car by its bailee, the Court concluded: 
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"In the tight of well established principles of law we 
are unwilling to hold that the unlawful conduct of the 
motor company effected ·a curtailment of its civil rights, 
in relation to other private individuals, or exposes the 
company to liability for injuries which did not proxi-
mately result from said unlawful conduct. That the act 
of the company in permitting Simpson to drive the auto-
mobile on the public highway with the dealer's license 
plate attached to the vehicle was not the proximate cause 
of Isaacs' death is too plain for argument. The accident 
would have occurred just as it did if the automobile had 
belonged to Simpson and had carried any other license 
plates or no license plate at all. The act of the motor 
company in permitting Simpson to use the automobile 
but remotely contributed to the accident by creating a 
condition in which the unforseen negligence of Simpson 
operated as the efficient cause of the collision. 
T4e various provisions of our statutes which relate to 
the use of license plates on an automobile disclose no 
legislative purpose to prevent collisions on the public 
highway. In disobeying those provisions the motor com-
pany did not violate any duty which it owed to Isaacs 
or to any other traveler on the public highway." 
Accordingly, a right of recovery was denied. 
39* *In the note aforesaid appended to this case the annotator 
states the following conclusion: 
"The majority of courts hold that the owner or oper-
ator of a motor vehicle is not charged with. liability nor 
precluded from recovery for injuries or damages· sus-
tained while operating it on the highway, although .such 
motor vehicle is equipped with improper license plates 
or is being used in pursuits or for purposes not authotized 
by the_ statute under which the license plates which it 
bears were issued, upon the ground that the unauthorized 
use of the license plates has no causal connection with 
the injury or damage." 
The note points out, however, that the State of Massachusetts is 
the single outstanding exception to this general rule, the holding in 
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that State being that an improperly licensed car is a trespasser or 
outlaw upon the highway, a doctrine not obtaining elsewhere. 
The decisions in many other States too numerous to mention 
support th1e uniform holding of the case apove. 
In the absence of any evidence in the case at bar which would 
tend remotely to show that the presence of the dealer's ta.gs upon 
Johnson's car at the time of the collision complained of had any 
causal connection with the collision or influenced the course of 
operation of either car, there could be no liability upon the petitioner 
for such improper or even unlawful use of_her dealer's plates. That 
Johnson and petitioner both indulged the hope of a future trade 
for another car has no possible bearing upon the situation and in 
no way influences or modifies the relation of bailor and bailee then 
existing between them. The sole question is one of causal 
40* connection and proximate result *and in the cl,bsence of any 
suggestion of such connection or result petitioner could not 
be held liable for Johnson's improper. operation or negligent con-
duct, a subject later to be discussed. 
It is, therefore, respectively submitted that had the Court per-
mitted petitioner to introduce evidence of the true facts which in-
disputably show that petitioner had gratuitously loaned Johnson her 
dealer's plates temporarily, there could have been no liability upon 
petitioner for Johnson's operation of the car. 
3. lnstriiction Y Refused. 
The second and fin.al assignment of error lies to the action of 
the Court in refusing clef endant's Instruction Y which is as follows: 
"The Court instructs the jury that unless they believe 
from the evidence that the defendant, Gertrude Robson 
Driver, knew or in the exercise of reasonable care, should 
have known on May 20, 1939, that the defendant Johnson 
was physically or mentally unfit to drive a car·, they must 
find for the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver." 
By this instruction the Court was asked to say to the jury that 
even though this petitioner be considered, under a strict enforce-
ment of Code Section 6126, as the master of the defendant Johnson, 
petitioner could not even then be held liable for damages resulting 
from Johnson's physical infirmity, unknown to petitioner, which 
caused him unexpectedl:r to faint and lose control of his car. 
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41 * Whether Johnson might have had reason to *believe that 
he might faint at any time ( in anticipation of which he 
would be negligent in assuming to drive a car) is at least doubtful 
under the facts in this case, though that issue was submitted to the 
jury by Instruction X. But in the admitted absence of evidence that 
petitioner knew of any such latent infirmity, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that petitioner ought not to be held liable for permitting I 
Johnson to drive. 
As a first step towards this concl~sion we submit that in the 
absence of proof that Johnson had reason to.anticipate his sudden 
illness he himself should not be held primarily liable, nor should 
his employer or master be held secondarily liable. That a driver 
unexpectedly fainting or losing consciousness while dr,iving a car is 
not to be held liable for injuries thereby inflicted was held by the 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in the case of C oh.en 
v. Petty ( 1935), 65 Fed. ( 2d), 820. The plaintiff was a guest on 
the rear seat of defendant's automobile which he was driving and 
in the course of th·e journey the defendant became suddenly sick 
and unco.nscious and the car left the road and injured the plaintiff. 
The defendant testified that he had fainted, that he had never , 
fainted before, that so far as he knew he was in good health and 
did not feel badly until the moment before the illness and fainting 
occurred. The sole question before the Court was whether under 
these circumstances the trial Court was justified in taking the case 
from the jury. Affirming its action in that respect the Cour.t of 
Appeals by Mr. Justice Groner said: 
42* "It is undoubtedly the law that one who is suddenly 
stricken by an illness, which he had no reason to antici-
pate, while driving an automobile, which renders it im-
possible for him to control the car, is not chargeable with 
negligence. Armstrong v. Cook, 250 Mich. 190, 229 
N. W. 433; Sfa.tter)' v. Haley,· Dom. Law Rep., 1923 
( 3), p. 156. . 
In the present case the positive evidence is all to the 
effect that defendant did not know and had no reason to 
think he would be subject to an attack such as overcame 
him. Hence negligence cannot be predicated in this case 
upon defendant's reck~essness in driving an automobile 
when he knew or should have known of the possibility of 
an accident from such an event as occurred. 
As the plaintiff wholly failed to show any actionable 
I 
I 
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negligence prior to the time the car left the road, or 
causing or contributing to that occurrence, and as the 
defendant's positive and uncontradicted evidence shows 
that the loss of control was due to defendant's sudden 
illness, it follows the action of the lower court was right." 
iJ The Court's conclusion in this case is the equivalent of a holding 
that negligence did not lie in the uncontrolled movement of the car 
after its driver had fainted but lay, if at all, in the act or the failure 
to act which caused the uncontrolled car to leave the highway. 
For a master to become derivatively liable for the cause which 
resulted in the unco~trolled movement of the car, namely, the 
fainting of the driver or his other infirmity or incompetency, the 
master must have or be charged with knowledge of such infirmity. 
In support of this conclusion we cite the principle as stated in 39 
C. J ., page 533 : 
"It is a well settled rule that to charge a master with 
negligence in employing or retainig an incompetent serv-
ant in his service it must be shown, in the absence of 
statutory regulation, that the master had either actual or 
constructive knowledge of such incompetency." 
43* *Of the cases cited in support of this statement those 
which we have read are suits brought by a servant against 
a master alleging in jury resulting from negligence of an incompetent 
fellow-servant. Such a case is that of -Cabin Branch Mining Co. v. 
Hiitchinson, 112 Va., 37, wherein the Court held that in order for 
one servant to allege sufficiently a charge that the master employed 
an incompetent fell ow-servant, it was necessary to allege that the 
master knew of the incompetence. While we have found no case 
to support our contention that upon the facts of the present case 
the petitioner should not be held accountable for a collision follow-
ing Johnson's loss of cqnsciousness, we earnestly submit that on 
this principle the accountability of one, held to the relationship of 
master by legal fiction, for the consequences growing out of one 
isolated act done under the theoretical employment, should be limited 
to results attributable to causes of which he knew or had reason to 
suspect, a,nd not to a latent infirmicy which neither he nor the State 
of Virginia which licensed him as a driver had reason to suspect. 
Johnson had such a driver's license, a fact of some import that 
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would create at least a presumption that he was not incompetent 
to drive. 
The considerations presented by this assjgnment are so closely 
related to those inhering under the first assignment as hardly to 
justify separate treatment, but they do present the direct question 
whether under the plaintiff's interpretation of Code Section 6126 
there could even then be any liability upon this petitioner. 
44* *CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the allegations of the 
notice of motion do not under the situation here presented require 
an affidavit to enable petitioner to show the true facts of the case. 
When these true facts as revealed by the record are considered, the 
conclusion is irresistible that the petitioner has been guilty of no 
actionable wrong _to the plaintiff. To hold otherwise would permit 
the plaintiff to allege a case of a bailment of license plates and 
recover upon a different case growing out of agency, contrary to 
the holding of this Court that the r.ecovery must be upon the case 
as sta.ted. 
"A party cannot charge one ground of negligence and 
recover upon another. The allegations and the proof 
must correspond." N. & W. Ry. Co. vs. Warden, 117 
Va. 801. 
To permit the present recovery against petitioner to stand would, 
as stated by this Court in Carlton v. Martin, supra, 
"be a manifest injustice to her ... when every fact in 
the case shows conclusively that she was in no sense 
liable for or responsible for it." 
Your petitioner, therefore, respectfully prays that this Honorable 
Court will award its writ of error and supersedeas to the judgment 
aforesaid and that the holdings of the Circuit Court of Amherst 
County in said proceeding may be reviewed and reversed and final 
judgment entered for this petitioner. 
Counsel for the petitioner desires to state orally the reasons 
why the writ of error and supersedeas prayed for should be 
45* . *granted, and in the event that the same are granted counsel 
will adopt this petition as their opening brief. A copy of 
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this petition was delivered to Mr. A. Lynch Ward, Jr., of counsel 
for Dorothy Brooks, on the 20th day of May, 1940, the original 
whereof is to be filed with Mr. Justice H. B. Gregory at Roanoke. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER, 
trading as Driver's Sales & Service. 
By 'WILLIAMS, ROBERTSOK & SACKETT, 
Attorneys. 
The undersigned attorney, practicing in the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, hereby certifies that, in his opinion, the judg-
ment complained of in the foregoing petition ought to be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Lynchburg, Virginia 
May 18, 1940. 
Respectfully, 
SAMUEL H. WILLIAMS. 
June 6, 1940. ·writ of error and superse<leas awarded by the 
Court. Bond $2500. M. B. W. 
' . 
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VIRGINIA: 
RECORD 
DOROTHY BROOKS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER, 
trading as Driver's Sales and Service and 
BERNARD JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Pleas before the Judge of the Circuit Court for the Cotinty of 
Amherst, at the Court House thereof, on October 25, 1939.: 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 25th day of 
September, 1939, came Dorothy Brooks and filed in the Clerk's 
Office of the said ·Court her notice of motion for judgment against 
Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as Driver's Sales & Se,rvice, and 
Bernard Johnson, which said notice of motion is· in the words and 
figures following, to-wit : 
TO GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER, trading as DRIVER'S 
SALES & SERVICE, and BERNARD JOHNSON: 
TAKE NOTICE, That the undersigned Dorothy Brool<s, here-
after called the plaintiff, will on the first day of the October, 1939, 
Term of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, or as soon 
thereafter as this motion may be heard, move the said Court at the 
courthouse thereof, for judgment against you, and each of you, 
for the sum of $5,000.00, for this, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 21st day of May, 1939, and at 
and during all the times herein mentioned and referred to, the said 
Gertrude Robson Driver was a dealer in motor vehicles in the Town 
of Waynesboro, Virginia, and was the owner, and had cont}ol, by 
and through her officers and agents, and otherwise, of 
page 2 ~ certain dealer's license plates for the State of Virginia, 
numbered, to-wit, 3928,- which had been issued for. the 
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year 1939, in accordance with the form of the statute for such 
cases made and provided. 
And on the, to-wit, 2_1st day of May, 1939, and at and during 
all the times herein mentioned and ref erred to, the said Bernard 
Johnson was physically and mentally unfit to drive an automobile, 
that is to say, his mind was impaired, he was suffering with a 
brain injury, was subject to fainting spells, and was in a run-down 
and weakened condition, both physically and mentally. And because 
of the said physical and mental condition of the said Bernard 
Johnson, it was, at and during all the times herein mentioned and 
referred to, reasonably probable and likely that he would have an 
accident if he undertook to drive an automobile. 
And at and during all the times .herein mentioned and referred 
to, the said Bernard Johnson knew of his said physical and mental 
condition, and the said Gertrude Robson Driver, through and by 
her officers and agents, and otherwise, knew, or but for the want 
of reasonable care, could and would have known, of the said 
physical and mental condition of said Bernard Johnson at and 
during all the times herein mentioned and referred to. 
And it thereupon became and was the duty of said Gertrude 
Robson Driver to refrain, by and through her officers and agents, 
and otherwise, from handing a set of said license plates to said 
Bernard Johnson and instructing him to bring a certain Plymouth 
· a·utomobile from Bedford, Virginia, to Waynesboro, Vir-
page 3 . ~ ginia, as hereinafter set forth. 
And it thereupon became and was the duty of said 
Bernard Johnson to refrain from undertaking to drive an auto-
mobile while he was in the aforesaid physical and mental condition. 
Yet notwithstanding the said duty of the said Gertrude Robson 
Driver, on the, to-wit, 21st day of May, 1939, the said Gertrude 
Robson Driver, by and through her officers and agents, negligently 
and without the use of ordinary care, handed a set of said dealer's 
license plates to said Bernard Johnson and instructed him, in effect, 
if not literally, to go to Bedford, Virginia, and put said license 
plates on a certain Plymouth automobile, not then owned by the 
said Gertrude Robson Driver, which was without license plates, 
and then drive said Plymouth automobile to the place of business 
of said Gertrude Robson Driver in Waynesboro, Virginia, ·without 
deviating from the most direct route from Bedford, Virginia, to 
vVaynesboro, Virginia, and without driving said Plymouth auto-
mobile for any purpose other than to move it from Bedford, Vir-
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gmia, to \Vaynesboro, Virginia, in accordance v.rith the ~foresaid 
instructions. 
And notwithstanding the said duty of the said Bernard Johnson, 
he pegligently, and without the use of ordinary care, accepted said 
license plates which were handed to him as aforesaid, and agreed 
to drive said Plymouth automobile from Bedford, Virginia, to 
Waynesboro, Virginia, in accordance with the aforesaid 
page 4 ~ instructions, and did undertake and attempt to drive said 
Plymouth automobile from Bedford, Virginia, to \Vaynes-
boro, Virginia, pursuant to his said instructions and agreement. 
And the said Bernard Johnson thereupon became and was a bona 
fide employee and agent of said Gertrude Robson Driver at and 
during all the times herein mentioned and ref erred to, and was, at 
and during all the times herein mentioned and referred to, acting 
in connection with and incident to the said business of the said 
Gertrude Robson Driver as a dealer in motor vehicles, and said 
Plymouth automobile was negligently operated as hereinafter set 
forth in . connection with and incident to said business of said 
Gertrude Robson Driver as a dealer in motor vehicles, that is to 
say, the said Gertrude Robson Driver contemplated and intended, 
by and through her officers and agents, and otherwise, that the said 
Plymouth automobile would, pursuant to a certain agreement and 
understanding, be traded in on at1other automobile upon its arrival 
at her said place of business in Waynesboro, Virginia, and that the 
legal title to said Plymouth automobile, pursuant to said agreement 
and understanding, v;ould then be transferred to said Gertrude 
Robson Driver in accordance with the form of statute for such 
case made and provided. 
And thereafter, to-wit, on the 21st day of May, 1939, at 
about 5 :30 P. M., the plaintiff was riding as a guest in a certain, 
to-wit, Pontiac automobile, which was then being lawfully driven 
towards Lynchburg, Virginia, by one, to-wit, Ruby 
page 5 ~ Tyler, over and along and to said Ruby Tyler's right of 
the center of a certain roadway in Amherst County, 
Virginia, to-wit, United States Highway No. 29, and the said 
Bernard Johnson was then and there driving the said Plymouth 
automobile, pursuant to his said instructions, over and along said 
highway in the opposite direction, namely, towards vVay:nesboro, 
Virg.inia; and the said Gertrttde Robson Driver, by and ! through 
the said Bernard Johnson, then and there operated and cqntrolled, 
and so operated and controlled at and during all the tim~s herein 
mentioned and referred to, the said Plymouth automobile, and at 
I 
I 
I 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
and during all the times herein mentioned and referred to, said 
Bernard Johnson was driving and operating said Plymouth auto-
mobile as the agent of said Gertrude Robson Driver, pursuant to 
his said instructions. · 
And it then and there became and was the duty of said Bernard 
Johnson in driving said Plymouth automobile along said highway, 
and in meeting the said Pontiac automobile in which the plaintiff 
was then and there riding as aforesaid in the opposite direction, 
to drive said Plymouth automobile seasonably to said Bernard 
Johnson's right of the centre of said roadway and to give to the 
said driver of the said Pontiac automobile, as nearly as possible, 
one-half of the main traveling portion of the said roadway, so that 
the said Plymouth automobile might pass the said Pontiac auto-
mobile without interference and without running into said Pontiac· 
automobile and injuring the plaintiff. 
p~ge 6 ~ Yet notwithstanding the duty of the said Bernard 
Johnson as he was driving said Plymouth automobile 
along said roadway as aforesaid and as he was meeting the said 
Pontiac automobile in which the plaintiff was lawfully riding as 
aforesaid, he negligently failed to keep a proper lookout so as to 
avoid injuring the plaintiff, to keep said Plymouth automobile 
under careful, reasonable and proper control, to drive, manage and 
operate said Plymouth automobile with ordinary care, to drive said 
Plymouth automobile seasonably to his right of the centre of said 
roadway, to give to the driver of said Pontiac automobile, as nearly 
as possibly, one-half of the main traveling portion of the said road-
way. And said Bernard Johnson did also then and there negligently 
drive said Plymouth automobile to his, to-wit, extreme left hand 
· side of the said roadway, and did then and there negligently cause, 
suffer and permit said Plymouth automobile to move to his, to-wit, 
extreme left hand side of said roadway and there strike the, to-wit, 
front end of said Pontiac automo.bile with great force and violence, 
and thereby, and as the direct, ·immediate and proximate result of 
all and every of the foregoing facts, the plaintiff was unseated 
and thrown with great force and violence upon and against the 
floor, sides and top of said Pontiac automobile. 
And also because of the premises and as the direct, immediate 
and proximate result of all and every of the foregoing facts, 
the plaintiff was caused to receive, and did receive, 
page 7 ~ the following injuries, to-wit: a ragged laceration of the 
right cheek about 3 0 inches in length which extended 
into the corner of her right eye, and which, after healing, has left 
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a permanent scar of about 3 ~ inches in length by approximately 
78 of an inch in width, which is exceedingly disfiguring, and which 
will be, and is, permanently disfiguring; a small laceration of her 
right cheek just to the right of her nose; two lacerations of the left 
hand and wrist ext.ending a:cross the back of the hand and wrist 
for a distance almost equal to the entire width of her wrist, both 
of which, after healing, have left permanent scars of the approx-
imate length of said lacerations and about 78 of an inch or more 
in width,· and which will also be, an~ are, permanently disfiguring; a 
severed extensor tendon of the middle finger of her left hand, which 
said finger · will be, and is, permanently impaired and disfigured; 
14 stitches on her right cheek, 9 stitches on the middle finger of the 
left hand, 15 on the back of her left hand and 7 on her left wrist. 
And also by reason of the p~emises, plaint~ff ~as ·otherwise lacerated 
and brui~ed ; became and was totally disabled and· prevented from 
attending to and trans~cting her necessary and lawful affairs in 
business, until, to-wit, June 21st,· 1939, and thereby lost time of 
the value of, to-wit, $60.00; and became and was sore, lame, dis-
ordered and disfigured and so continued for a long space of time, 
, to-wit, hitherto, and will so continue in the future per-
page 8 ~ manently. And also by reason of the premises, the plain-
tiff underwent great pain, both physical and mental, until, 
to-wit, June 21st, 1939, and in the futhre plaintiff will suffer men-
tally because of her said permanent disfigurement, and will suffer 
g,;eat physical pain in and about endeavoring to have a part of said 
disfiguring scars removed. And also by reason of the premises, it 
became and was necessary for the plaintiff to become obligated to 
expend, and the plaintiff did become obligated to expend, the sum 
of, to-wit, $100.00, in and about endeavoring to get healed and 
cured of her said injuries. Arid also by reason of the premises, it 
will be necessary for the plaintiff to expend the sum of,· to-wit, 
$3,000.00 in and about having parts of said disfiguring scars re-
moved by skin grafting or otherwise. 
Wherefore, ·said plaintiff saith that she is injured, and hath sus-
' tained damages to the amount of $5,000.00. And therefore,. she 
institutes this action at law. 
A. LYNCH WARD, JR., p. q. 
ABBOT, OULD & WARD, of counsel. 
I 
DOROTHY BROOKS, 
By Counsel. 
I 
I 
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page 9 ~ VIRGINIA: 
At a Circuit Court, continued and held for the County of Am-
herst, at the Court House thereof, on October 25, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-nine. 
DOROTHY BROOKS, 
v. 
GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER, trading as DRIVER'S SALES 
AND SERVICE, and BERNARD JOHNSON. 
Motion for Judgment, $5,000.00. 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys and in their 
own proper persons, and the defendants, Gertrude Robson Driver, 
trading as Driver's Sales & Service, and Bernard Johnson, for plea 
say that they are not guilty in manner and form as the said plaintiff, 
Dorothy Brooks, in her notice of motion for judgment against them 
hath alleged, and of this they put themselves upon the country, and 
the plaintiff likewise. And thereupon came a jury, to-wit: Clinton 
McDaniel, H. C. Gillispie, A. E. Hicks, H. H. Harrison, J. W. 
Lipscomb, John A. Stanley and R. B. Ricketts, who having been 
selected, tried and impaneled in the manner directed by law from 
the veniremen regularly and duly summoned to this term, were 
duly sworn well and truly to try the issue joined and a true verdict 
render according to the law and the evidence. 
Upon the completion of the plaintiff's evidence in this case 
the defendant, Driver's Sales & Service, moved the 
page 10 ~ Court to strike the said evidence upon the ground that 
the same fails to show any connection between the de-
fendant, Driver's Sales & Servic'e, and said injury; that nothing has 
been proven whatsoever to establish any liability upon them or any 
semblance of proof of the case stated in the notice of motion, which 
motion the Court overruled, to which action of the Court in over-
ruling said motion the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, trading 
as Driver's Sales & Service, excepted. 
And upon the completion of all the evidence the defendant, 
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Gertrude Robson Driver, renews her motion formerly made for 
reasons heretofore stated, and upon the further ground that there 
is no evidence to show actionable negligence or causal connection, 
which motion the Court overruled, to which action of the Court 
in overruling the said motion the defendant, Gertrude Robson 
Driver, by counsel, excepts. 
And the said jury having fully heard the evidence and arguments 
of counsel were sent to their room to consider of their verdict and 
after some time spent therein they returned into court and rendered 
the following verdict, "We the jury find for the plaintiff, Dorothy 
Brooks, against the defendants, Gertrude Robson Driver, trading 
as Driver's Sales & Service, and Bernard Johnson, and assess her 
damages at Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00)." 
(Signed) J. W. LIPSCOMB, Foreman." 
page 11 ~ Therefore, it is considered by the Court that the plain-
tiff, Dorothy Brooks, recover of and against the defend-
ant, Bernard Johnson, the sum of Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00), the amount of damages against him by the jurors in 
their verdict ascertained, and her costs by her about her suit in this 
behalf expended. · 
And the defendant Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as Driver's 
Sales & Service, moves the Court ·to set aside the said verdict of 
the jury as to her as being contrary to the law and the evidence 
and without evidence to support it and to enter up final judgment 
in her favor, and assigns as grounds for her said motion the action 
of the Court in overruling her motion to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence, in excluding and admitting evidence on trial, and granting 
and refusing instructions, and in its rulings upo.n the effect of this 
defendant's failure to file an affidavit under Code Section 6126, 
.and for other errors assigned on trial, which motion is ordered to 
be docketed for hearing at some future date. · 
And at another date, to-wit: 
VIRGINIA: 
At a Circuit Court for the County of Amherst, continued and 
held at the Court House thereof, on Wednesday, the 8th day of 
November, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and I thirty-
nine. 
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page 12 ~ This day came the defend~nt, Bernard Johnson, by 
counsel, and moved the Court to set aside the verdict of 
the jury heretofore rendered against him herein by the jury on the 
25th day of October, 1939, as contrary to the law and the evidence, 
and without evidence .to support i.t, and to enter final judgment in 
his favor, which motion is docketed; and the Court doth order that 
so much of the order hereinbefore entered ri"n Oc.tober 25th, 1939, 
herein as pronounced and rendered judgment on said verdict against 
said Bernard Johnson be and the same, to that extent only, is 
vacated, set aside and annulled, for and until further determination. 
And at another date, to-wit: 
VIRGINIA: 
At a Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, continued and held 
at the Court House thereof, on Saturday, the 13th day of April, 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty. 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys and the Court, 
having duly considered the respective motions of the defendants, 
Gertrude Robson Driver and Bernard. Johnson, to set aside the 
verdict heretofore rendered against them, upon the grounds here-
tofore rendered against them, upon the grounds heretofore assigned, 
doth overrule the same, to which action of the Court the defendant 
Gertrude Robson Driver doth except. Therefore, it is· 
page 13 ~ considered by the Court that the plaintiff recover of 
the defendants the sum of Two -Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00), with interest thereon from October 25, 1939, and her 
costs by her in this behalf expended. And the defendant Gertrude 
Robson Driver in?icating her desire to apply to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals for a writ of error to said judgment, it is ordered that 
the said judgment and any execution thereon be suspended for a 
period of sixty (60) days from' the entry of this order, upon the 
defendant Gertrude Robson Driver, or some one for- her, entering 
into a suspending bond within fifteen ( 15) days from this date in 
the penalty of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), conditioned ac-
cording to law. 
·page 14 ~ OPINION. 
This is an action brought by said Plaintiff, Dorothy Brooks, 
against said Defendants, Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as 
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Driver's Sales and Service, and Bernard Johnson, by Notice of 
Motion for judgment, returnable to the first day of the October 
Term of said Court, 1939, (Oct. 9, 1939), to recover for alleged 
personal injuries growing out of an automobile accident, which 
occurred in said County on May 21, 1939. Issue was taken or 
made to said Notice by the general plea of "not guilty," which 
was submitted to and tried by a jury on October 25, 1939, and 
after all evidence had been taken, instructions given and arguments 
of Counsel heard, the jury found and returned a verdict for said 
Plaintiff in the sum and amount of $2,000.00 against both of said 
Deferidants. 
T~e position taken by the Defendants is clearly stated in the 
order of the Court, entered on October 25, 1939, which for pur-
eoses desired, is as follows, to-wit: 
" ........ Upon the completion of the Plaintiff's evidef!Ce in 
this case, the Defendant, Driver's Sales and Service, moved the 
Court to strike the said evidence, upon the ground that the same 
fails to show any connection between the Defendant, Driver's Sales 
and Service, and said injury; that nothing has been proved what-
soever to establish any liability upon them, or any semblance of 
proof of the case stated in the Notice of Motion ...... " 
" ...... And upon the completion of all of the evidence, the 
Defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, renews her motion formerly 
made for reasons heretofore stated, and upon the further ground 
that there is no evidence to show actionable negligence or causal 
connection . . . . . " 
" ..... And the Defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, trading 
as Driver's Sales and Service, moves the Court to set-aside the said 
verdict of the jury as to herself as being contrary to the law 
and the evidence and without evidence to support it and 
page 15 ~ to enter up final judgment in her favor, and assigns as 
grounds for her said motions the actions of the Court in 
overruling her motions to strike the Plaintiff's evidence, in exclud-
ing and admitting evidence on trial, and granting arid refusing 
instructions, and in its ruling upon the effect of this Defendant's 
failure to file an affidavit under Code Sec. 6126, and for other errors 
assigned on trial." 
The aforesaid motions were overruled and due exceptions taken; 
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motion was also made at a later date to set-aside said verdict on 
behalf of the Defendant, Be.rnard Johnson, to which proper con-
sideration was given. The foregoing covers. entirely the contentions 
of the Defendants, which may be briefly and summarily stated as 
borne out by the briefs as follows, to-wit: 
( 1 )-The evidence is' not sufficient to support any recovery-
the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence and without evi-
dence to support it; 
( 2)-The Court committed error in the admission and exclusion 
of evidence, concerning especially its rulings under and as to Sec·. 
6126 of the Code of Va., for failure to file affidavit required by that 
statute; and, 
( 3 )-The Court erred in granting and refusing instructions. 
The grounds stated under ( 1) and ( 3) will be dealt with briefly, 
and, as justified herein, appear to have been abandoned and the 
entire contention anchored to ground ( 2), which concerns Va. Code 
Sec. 6126 as to the admission and exclusion of 'evidence, instruc-
tions and proof. These grounds will be taken up in order. 
( 1 )-The evidence is not sufficient to support any 
page 16 ~ recovery-the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law 
and the evidence and without evidence tq support it. 
The facts germane to this case may be briefly stated as fo.llows: 
The Defendant, Bernard Johnson, had a car located in the Town 
of Bedford, Va.1 which he was contemplating trading in to the 
Defendant, Driver's Sales and Service, for another car. He did 
not have any plates for his car, and after some negotiation with 
the Driver's Sales and Service, secured certain dealers plates from 
it for the purpose of going to Bedford, Va., and bringing back 
to the Driver's Sales and Service at Waynesboro, Va., his car, in 
order to make the trade· and complete the transaction-such was 
the purpose in view. On Saturday, May 20, 1939, the plates were 
delivered by the representatives of the Driver's Sales and Service 
to the said Bernard Johnson for the purpose of bringing back his 
car, and on Sunday, May 21, 1939, he went to Bedford, Va., at-. 
tached the plates to his car, and, while returning, near Piney River, 
Amherst County, Va., ran into and collided with the car in which 
the Plaintiff, Dorothy Brooks, was riding, thereby inflicting upon 
her the injuries and damages complained of. The evidence over-
whelmingly shows that the car occupied by the Plaintiff was travel-
ing well over on its side of the public highway-as a matter of 
fact, had gotten off of the hard surface, when suddenly and un-
expectedly, the car in which Bernard Johnson was traveling and 
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which he was driving, came from his right hand side of the road 
across the highway over on his left, striking and colliding 
page 17 ~ with the car in which the Plaintiff was situated. There 
was contention that Bernard Johnson was laboring under 
some lack of consciousness or fainting spell, which caused him to 
lose control of his car; on one hand, some stated that he was lean- • 
ing over to one side or over on his steering wheel with his head 
bent do~n as his car crossed the road into the Brooks car, while on 
the other hand, there was evidence tending to show that he was 
sitting up straight, witp both hands on the steering wheel, and 
occupying a posture such as would be occupied by anyone driving 
an automobile. Under the facts as shown by the evidence, and all 
of which was heard and seen by the jury, the conclusion is inevitable 
that they were fully justified in concluding that the Defendant, 
Bernard Johnson, negligently and carelessly operated his car so 
that it ran from his right side to his wrong side of the road, con-
_ trary to the law, thereby causing the accident, and giving to the said 
Plaintiff the right of recovery. Certainly, there is sufficient credible 
evidence in the case fully to, warrant the verdict of the jury and 
nothing to sufficiently militate against it to show that the verdict is 
wrong. This issue was clearly submitted to the jury, as will be 
subsequently pointed out, and found contrary to the contention 
made by the Defendants, which does not appear to be strenuously 
relied upon, not even by the Defendant, Bernard Johnson, himself 
-he does not assert his inability to drive in any clear degree, but 
gives a clear narrative of the curves of the road and the 
page 18 ~ lack of his remembrance or recollection as to what trans-
pired, and as is often the case in accidents which result 
in producing unconsciousness. 
( 2 )-The Court erred 'in its actions in admitting and excluding 
of evidence and its rulings under and as to Sec. 6126 of the Code 
of Va., for failure to file affidavit required by that statute. 
Section 6126 of the Code of Va. has been and apparently con-
tinues to be an obstacle for many legal battles. This Sec. reads as 
follows to-wit: 
"Where a bill, declaration or other pleading alleges that any 
person or corporation, at a stated time, owned, o.perated or con-
trolled any property or instrumentality, no proof of the fact alleged 
shall be required, unless an affidavit be filed with the pleading, 
putting it in issue, denying specifically and with particularity that 
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such property or instrument~lity was at the time alleged so owned, 
operated or controlled." 
There have been several cases cited and referred to concerning 
this Section, which will be dealt with briefly: Kennedy Coal Cor-
. poration vs. Buckhorn Coal Corporation, 140 Va., Page 37,' is con-
cerned primarily with wh€ther or not Sec. 6126 is retroactive and 
has no bearing here; in the case of Green vs. Lum, 147 Va., p. 382, 
in dealing with this Section, the Court stated: 
"No such affidavit was filed. If it has been, the Plaintiff might 
have proved the relation of master and servant or other facts· which 
would have imposed liability upon Green. In the absence of the 
affidavit, no such burden was imposed upon the Plaintiff." 
This was stated by the Court where the operation of an auto-
mobile was alleged to have been carried on by an agent of 
page 19 ~ the defendant. In the case of Barnes vs. Hampton, 149 
Va., Page 740, the allegation as to servant and agent was 
completely denied by the affidavit filed· in accordance with Sec. 
6126, and the burden to prove agency was cast upon the defendant, 
of which the Court said: 
"she has overcome the burden and established the non-existence 
of the relation at the time the jury was inflicted upon the plaintiff 
by positive and uncontradicted evidence." 
In the case of Maryland Casualty Co. vs. Cole, 156 Va., p. 707, 
there was a failure to file the affidavit in accord with Sec. 6126, 
and it was held that no proof of agency was necessary, and that 
agency based upon partnership could not be proven by deposition 
in another case. The case of Turner vs. Carneal, 156 Va., p. 889, 
appears to be beside the mark for the contention here; in dealing 
with this Section, the facts are not at all applicable, and bearing out 
the principle that the Section is highly remedial and is to be liberally 
construed, the Court states : 
"The declaration does not allege, nor does the proof show that 
the defendant had such tontrol of the premises as comes within the 
purview of the statute." 
This indicates clearly that the allegation required by the statute 
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is not made, nor do the facts of the case bring it within its purview. 
In the case of Sydnor and Hundley vs. Bonifant, 158 Va., p. 703, 
the plea, together with the affidavit required by the statute, was 
duly filed, and the contention there was whether or not 
page 20 ~ agency had been sufficien~ly proven by the plaintiff to 
justify recovery-in other words, whether or not the 
ownership of the car would justify a presumption of agency or that 
the driver was the servant and agent of the owner, and the Court 
held under the facts of that case, that the burden was sufficiently 
borne. In the case of Vandergrift vs. Summerall, 158 Va., p. 725, 
no affidavit was fited, and the Court used this language, to-wit: 
"No such affidavit was filed and so the plaintiff had the right to 
assume that agency was admitted and had not come prepared to 
prove it. Manifestly it would have been unfair to require her to do 
so after she had closed her case in chief. This is exactly the situa-
tion which the statute was designed to meet. It is remedial and 
should be liberally construed." 
In the case of Buchanan vs.· Wilson, 159 Va., p. 49, the necessary 
plea, together with affidavit, under Sec. 6126, were duly filed, 
thereby shifting the burden of the proof of agency to the plaintiff, 
which it was held, could, after the showing of a prima facie case, 
be done by the declarations and admissions of the agent, himself. 
In the case of Carlton vs. Martin, 160 Va., p. 119, it was held that 
the statute ( 6126) did not apply for the reason that notice filed 
contained no specific allegation that the defendant owned, operated 
or controlled the automobile involved ; in discussing this question in 
Morris vs. Dame's Exewtor, 161 Va., p. 545, the Court said: 
"If no such affidavit had been filed, the plaintiff would have been 
relieved by Sec. 6126 of the necessity of proving that the driver had 
the authority expressed or implied of his master to suffer, permit 
or invite the plaintiff to ride in the truck" ; 
In the case of Kirn vs. Bember)', 163 Va., p. 891, ~he Court 
state: 
page 21 ~ "There was no specific allegation that Henry Kirn as 
distinguished from Charley Elliott, owned, operated or 
controlled the.true~. Plaintiff, without objection, permitted evidence 
to be introduced, if true, clearly shows that Kirn was neither the 
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owner or operator of the truck, nor was he in any way responsible 
for the acts of Charley Elliott." 
In this case, the allegation in the pleading did not justify or 
require the affidavit, and in a4dition, the plaintiff had permitted 
proof of the lack of ownership or operation of the instrumentality 
involved to show the lack of liability, and in granting a new trial, 
it held that since the verdict had been set-aside for inadequacy, in 
view of all the surroundings facts and circumstances, it should be 
heard on all issues, to give the defendants an opportunity to show 
lack of lia~ility; and lastly, in the case of Lough vs. Lyon, 168 Va., 
p. 136, the statute was held not to apply where the basis of recovery 
was not brought within its terms-in this case, the plaintiff could 
only recover by showing· the relationship of master and servant 
existing between the defendant and the plaintiff, and the duty of 
the master to provide a safe place for the servant to work, and 
since these requirements were not covred by the statute, hence it 
could not be invoked. 
The foregoing cases dealing with Sec. 6126, of course, have been 
merely mentioned and referred to briefly, showing their lack of 
application to the case at bar and the fact that they all, either ex-
pressly or by implication, uphold or maintain the conclusion which 
appears to be inevitable in this case. These cases discuss 
page 22 ~ and compile the cases as they go and as they have been 
decided, without prolonging what is here said beyond 
unnecessary limits. In view of Sec. 6126 above quoted, what is the 
situation here invoking the terms of that statute-is agency, opera-
tion and control sufficiently and clearly alleged to bring it within 
the terms thereof and to require an affidavit in accordance there-
with before any burden of proof is required by the plaintiff to 
prove those allegations? It is beHeved that there are. The Notice 
of Motion charges the Driver's Sales and Service by carrying on 
a business "by and through her officers and agents" and this allega-
tion continuing from page 1 to page 3 thereof, where we find this 
summary of the facts and general allegations preceding, to-wit: 
"And the said Bernard Johnson thereupon became and was a 
bona fide employee and agent of said Gertrude Robson Driver at 
and during all the times herein mentioned and referred to, and was 
at and during all the times herein mentioned and referred to, acting 
in connection with and incident to the said business of the said 
Gertrude Robson Driver as a dealer in motor vehicles"; and 
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continuing further this thought and these allegations as to the ,re-
lationship between Bernard Johnson and Gertrude Robson Driver, 
trading as Driver's Sales and Service, on page 4: 
"And the said Bernard Johnson was then and there driving the 
said Plymouth automobile pursuant to his said instructions over 
and along said highway in the opposite direction, namely, toward 
Waynesboro, Va., and the said Gertrude Robson Driver by and 
through the · said Bernard Johnson then and there operated and 
controlled and so operated and controlled at and during all the 
times herein mentioned and referred to the said Plymouth auto-
mobile and at and during all the times herein mentionec'i and re-
ferred to, said Bernard Johnson was driving and operating said 
Plymouth automobile as the agent of said Gertrude Robson Driver, 
pursuant to his said instr~ctions." 
page 23 ~ And so, while the aforesaid quotations from said Notice 
of Motion are pointed out to show the emphatic and clear 
allegations of agency, operation and control existing between said 
Bernard Johnson and Gertrude Robson 'Driver, trading as Driver's 
Sales and Service, it is impossible to read the said Notice 'of Motion 
without seeing and grasping beyond any question from the four 
corners of the Notice, and practically from the beginning to the 
end, that such agency is set-up, alleged and averred, and the opera-
tion and control of the automobile was through that agency con-
nected with and attributed to the said Gertrude Robson Driver, 
doing business as aforesaid. As heretofore pointed out, when this 
case was called for trial, there was a mere plea of the general issue 
by "not guilty," unaccompanied and unsupported by any affidavit, 
and after and as soon as it was attempted to show the lack of 
agency or lack of operation and control in face of said allegations 
and after all evidence had been introduced by both sides, then, and 
not until then, was leave asked to file the required affidavit, though 
such affidavit was never tendered or exhibited. Therefore, it must 
be conclued that the Plaintiff, by her allegations, was entitled to 
rely upon the force and effect of them without the necessity of 
proof-by virtue of said statute, they were taken to be true and 
without the requirement of proof, unless the Defendants had denied 
them by a proper plea duly verified by affidavit, bring~ng 
page 24 ~ themselves withi~ the terms of the statute. This was safe-
guarded through the entire case. There has been some-
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thing said in .later argument relying upon the language in decided 
cases taken from several cited, that the statute was not meant to 
trap or entrap the "unwary." This cannot avail in this case, for 
the Plaintiff, it appears, relied upon the statute, as she had a right 
to do, and the Defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, well knew of 
the statute and considered it as pertaining to the case and felt it 
justified in not complying with the statute, believing that it was 
inapplicable. But if we have a statute such as is under review here, 
who, in the last analysis, may be the "unwary" and who may be 
"entrapped",-the Plaintiff has a right to rely upon· the statute, 
having mad~e the necessary allegations, and if, when occupying 
that position, she feels safe in it, is finally brought to a position 
of unpreparedness, then the question of unwariness may be con-
strued into a snare or a maelstrom, which enticed the Plaintiff in 
the exercise of supreme diligence to come to a position where she 
:would be wholly unprotected; here, everything appears to have been 
open and understood : The Plaintiff made her allegations in accord 
with the statute-the Defendant realized and knew of the position, 
but did not care to bring herself within its terms until she had gone 
to a position, which, as stated in Vandergrift vs. Summerall, supra: 
"Mani£ estly it would have been unfair to require her to do so 
after she had closed her case in chief. This is exactly the situation 
which the statute was designed to meet. It is remedial and should 
be liberally construed." 
page 25 ~ Otherwise, the Plaintiff here would be in the class of 
the "unwary." 
Therefore, it is respectfully concluded that the authorities cited 
· above as applied fulli and clearly to the facts, circumstances and 
proceedings in this case, sustained expressly and by inference, that 
the Plaintiff having alleged the agency, operation and control in 
her Notice of Motion, is not required to prove it, but it is taken for 
granted and admitted, and unless the plea denies such allegations 
by affidavit with the plea, placing it or them in issue, such cannot 
be shown. -It comes too late, after all evidence has been taken and 
the case rested on .its merits. 
( 3 )-The Court erred in granting and refusing instructions. 
lt is not understood that any instructions given were .objected 
to. The only question of law to which there was any serious con-
tention was the one involved under Va. Code Sec. 6126, which ,was 
really taken from the jury as a matter of legal construction. The 
I 
·I 
I 
I 
I 
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instructions were contained in instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and x~ 
There was one question hereinbefore adverted as to whether or 
not the accident was an unavoidable one, brought out from circum-
stances and physical or mental derangements beyond the control of 
Bernard Johnson as the agent of the Driver's Sales and Service, 
and it was on this branch of the case that evidence was 
page 26 ~ admitted to show the condition of the said Bernard 
Johnson, about which there was conflict. If the accident 
was so made unavoidable, for which purpose this line of testimony 
was fully admitted, the jury were told by instruction X as follows,. 
to-wit: 
''The Court instructs the jury that an unavoidable accident is 
such an occurrence as ·under the circumstances could not have been 
foreseen or anticipated in exercise of ordinary care. And if the 
jury believe from the evidence that this accident was caused by the 
Defendant, Bernard Johnson, fainting or losing consciousness and 
that such fainting or loss of consciousness, could not have reason-
ably foreseen, then the accident ;was an avoidable accident and the 
jury should find for the Defendants." 
There was no question at all of the Driver's Sales and Service 
having any knowledge of the defect, if any, in Bernard Johnson 
as a driver to make it liable, but the jury was told that if the acci-
dent, as they might believe, was so rendered unavoidable on account 
of the condition, they should find for both Defendants. On this 
point, the jury believed that there was liability-that agency, opera-
tion and control were duly and legally established and that the 
accident was not brought aboutthrough mental or physical deficiency 
beyond the control of the driver, Bernard Johnson, such as to bring 
it within the unavoidable-accident class. 
In contemplation and consideration of all legal and lawful intents 
and purposes, the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver,· trading as 
Driver's Sales and Service, was operating and controlling said 
automobile that caused the accident involved, by and through her 
Agent and Servant, Bernard Johnson, and since negli-
page 27 ~ gence, the basis of recovery, has been shown, it. would 
seem the verdict is correct and proper, and, therefore, 
the motion made to set it aside and grant a new trial, for the reasons 
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and grounds stated, is respectfully overruled and judgment \yill be 
entered thereon accordingly. 
Amherst, Va. 
Apr. 8th, 1940. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(Signed) ED\VARD MEEKS, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Va. 
page 28 ~ VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY. , 
DOROTHY BROOKS, Plaintiff, 
v. 
GERTRUDE ROBSON DRIVER, trading as DRIVER'S SALES 
& SERVICE, and BERNARD JOHNSON, Defendants. 
TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE. 
Stenographic report of all the evidence and other incidents of 
trial, including motion to strike plaintiff's evidence made at the 
~ompletion of plaintiff's evidence, and the renewal of said motion 
at the completion of all the evidence, of the trial of the above styled 
case, tried in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, at Amherst, 
Virginia, on October 25th, 1939, before Honorable Edward Meeks, 
Judge, and a jury. 
PRESENT: 
A. Lynch Ward, Jr., Lucian A. Shrader and Harold B. Singleton, 
counsel for plaintiff. 
S. H. Williams and Henry M. Sackett, counsel for the defendant 
Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as Driver's Sales & Service. 
Humes S. Franklin, counsel for the defendant Bernard Johnson. 
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OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. S. H. WILLIAMS. 
May it please the Court-Gentlemen of the Jury: 
Mr. Henry Sackett and I in this case represent Mrs. Driver, the 
lady sitting here, who is doing business in Waynesboro under the 
style of Driver's Sales and Service. It is a business which .she 
inherited from her late husband who died some years ago. ~he has 
no active connection with the business since then but has been the 
owner of it, but her business has been conducted by her son-in-law, 
Mr. Schwab, the gentleman sitting right here. The man sitting by 
Mrs. Driver is Mr. Lamb, whose name you heard called. These 
gentlemen, Mr. Schwab and Mr. Lamb, are connected with the 
business of Driver's Sales & Service in Waynesboro. 
I dare say you gentlemen have had some mental curiosity as to 
why we are in this case. The gentleman who was driving the car 
involved in this case, Mr. Johnson, sitting here, is represented by 
Mr. Franklin. According to the notice of motion-that is, the 
statement that is filed which sets up a cause o·f action or a suit-
Mrs. Driver has been sued in this case out of these facts and circum-
stan.ces; that the Plymouth car which Mr. Johnson was driving on 
the day of this accident, Sunday, May 21st, last, had on it license 
tags, the dealer's license tags belonging to Driver's Sales & Service 
of Waynesboro. He happened to be driving with those tags on his 
car under these circumstances, as we propose to show you from the 
evidence: 
page 30 ~ Mr. Johnson lives in Waynesboro and has lived there 
for several' years, I don't know how many. A week or 
so prior to the accident Mr. Johnson, the owner of a Plymouth 
car, approached Mr. Lamb who works for Driver's Sales & Service . 
with this story: that Mr. Johnson had a Plymouth car which was 
registered in 1938 but not registered in 1939; that just before his 
1938 license tags expired he had driven that car to his father's 
home in Bedford County and there the car broke down, ref1,.1sed to 
nm,. and he came to Waynesboro without it. Mr. Johnson had 
perhaps seen some second-hand car in Driver's that he might be 
interested in and he told Mr. Lamb this : "If I could get my car 
back from Bedford to Waynesboro we might be able to get together 
on a trade. I like the looks of this car in here. Could you lend me 
a pair of your plates?" This was in May when the 1938 tags ex-
pired, so Mr. Johnson had not renewed his license for 1939 and 
therefore needed some tags to drive his car from Bedford back to 
I 
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Waynesboro. So he said to Mr. Lamb, "Could you lend me a pair 
of your dealer's plates to drive this car back over here?" Mr. 
Lamb said, "Well, this is Monday or Tuesday," whichever it was, 
"Come back in here Saturday and I will see whether we have any 
,plates available and we will see about getting them then." So. Mr. 
Lamb went about his business and Mr. Johnson went about his 
business, but on Saturday afternoon Mr. Johnson appeared and 
renewed his request of Mr. Lamb that he be allowed a pair of 
these license plates to bring this car back from Bedford. 
Mr. Lamb, who is the mechanical man there-attends 
page 31 ~ to the details of the place there, took Mr. Johnson to Mr. 
Schwab who is the manager for Mrs. Driver, and pre-
sented Mr. Johnson's request that he would like to borrow a pair 
of plates t~ bring his car back from Bedford. So Mr. Schwab said, 
"All right, there is a pair available. We will lend them to him." 
So the license plates, the dealer's tags, were loaned to Mr. Johnson 
then and there. Mr. Schwab got out the book furnished by the 
State Highway for the purpose and wrote him out a permit that 
"Mr. B. M. Johnson' is hereby permitted to use Dealer's tags so and 
so for May 21st only" and gave him the permit so if a highway 
officer sho'uld stop him with a "What are you doing driving under 
these dealer's· tags" there was a paper showing to who they were 
issued and and that the owner of the tags had authorized Mr. 
Johnson to make use of the tags. 
That \fas on Saturday afternoon. The next thing that they heard 
was probably the following Monday to the effect that Mr. Johnson, 
in returning from Bedford to Waynesboro with this car of Mr. 
Johnson's and bearing the borrowed license tags, was involved in 
this accident. 
We propose to show you gentlemen, in response to the charges 
made against Mrs. Driver-and I mention Mrs. Driver because she 
is the named defendant. She owns the business, but in response to 
those charges made we propose to show you that Mr. Lamb had 
known_ Mr. Johnson for sometime, seen him around Waynesboro 
driving his car; that he .had been to_ the garage for gas and. oil and 
to get periodical check-ups. 
Mr. Schwab, on the contrary, had never known Mr. 
page 32 ~ Johnson, knew nothing whatever to make them suspect 
that Mr. Johnson was not a fit man to drive-had no 
interest whatever in it except the hope that possibly Mr. Johnson. 
and they, as Mr. Johnson had stated, might be able to get together 
on a trade, but beyond that the loan of the license tags was entirely 
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Sallie Hendricks. 
as a favor to Mr. Johnson. They had no reason to suspect that 
Mr. Johnson had fainting spells. They simply knew nothing about 
him whatever, but in response to Mr. Johnson's request they loaned 
him the license tags and he made the trip. 
So, gentlemen of the jury, we entertain the confident belief that 
.at the close of the testimony", and in view of the testimony that is 
produced here, his Honor will instruct you as to the liability, if any, 
imposed upon these garage people for this accident that Mr. 
Johnson's car was in simply because their license tags were on Mr. 
Johnson's car. 
It is our belief a;1d our contention will be in this case that the 
fact that these license tags were on that car had nothing to do with 
the accident and there is no responsibility at all upon the Driver's 
Sales & Service growing out of the sole and simple fact it was 
. their license tags on Mr. Johnson's car, and if perchance that issue 
should be submitted to you, then, upon the evidence as we propose 
to reveal it to you here, in line with what I have just told you, your 
verdict may be for the defendant, Mrs. Driver, there being, as I 
say, no connection whatever between Mrs. Driver's tags and the 
injuries which Mrs. Brooks received or of which she now complains 
and. is suing. 
page 33 ~ The witness, SALLIE HENDRICKS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. Mrs. Hendricks, were you in the car with Mrs. Brooks on 
May 21st when Mr. Johnson ran into her? 
A. I certainly was. 
Q. Look at the jury and tell them all you know about it and how 
it happened. ' 
A. ·Well, we were coming on home and at that curve up here 
this side of Waynesboro, way up somewhere, or Piney River, and 
we were on our side of the road, and when we saw him he just 
come right on into us. He run right into us is all I can say. It 
JUSt scared me and knocked me up in the car. I didn't have sense 
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enough to know anything. He ju·st ran right into our car and 
"busted" the front of it all to pieces. 
Q. You were sitting- in the back? 
A. I was in the back part. 
Q. Was the car you were in on the right or left side of the road? 
A. We were on our side coming toward Lynchburg. We were 
coming this way and he was going that way and he came straight 
into us. 
Q. ·where was the car you were in when he ran into you? 
A. We were off on the side of the road. We tried to give him 
all the road we could. We didn't have four fodt of the road. The 
policeman said we didn't have four foot of the road. One 
page 34 ~ wheel was way off on the dirt road, you know. If she had 
gone a little farther she would have run into the ditch and 
the man hit us on the side, jus_t knocked all of the back 
of the car up on me and they didn't know where I was at for a 
right smart while. I couldn't holler. I. could only do just like that 
( the witness gasps), and it broke my glasses and I didn't know 
what had happened. After the r·est of them got out they didn't 
kno,v where I was at because all the back of the car was leaning 
on my back. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin : 
Q. Mrs. Hendricks, did you see this car before the crash? 
A. I saw it when it was coming right on into us. 
Q. Did you see the driver in the car? 
A. I saw him sitting t!nder the wheel. 
Q. Now, was he under the wheel or was he laying over to 
the side? 
A. I couldn't tell you. I just saw his head. I was in the back 
and· the others were in front of me. I saw his head and he was 
coming right on jnto us-and it was done so quick. 
Q. Did you see 'the top of his heal? 
A. I just saw his head. I don't know whether it was the top 
or side. 
Q. Then you wouldn't say one way or the other whether he was 
laying over to the side or whether he was on the steering wheel? 
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A. He was laying over on the side. 
page 35 ~ Q. Over on the side like this? (indicating) 
A. No, he was sitting under the wheel, it looked like to me, just 
coming right into us. 
Q. Did you talk to Mr. Canada or Mr. Stratton about this acci-
dent? 
A. I don't know Mr. Str~tton or 'Mr. Canada either. 
Q. Did you talk to some strangers that came up there about this 
accident right after it happened? 
A. No, I didn't. I didn't talk to any of them, only was just talk-
ing about the man running into us. I didn't even know who the 
man was. 
Q. Two men were talking to you? 
A. I don't know who they were though. 
Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Stratton or Mr. Canada that this man had 
fallen over in his seat, over on the side of the car? 
A. I don't remember telling that, about falling anywhere. 
Q. You don't deny telling him that? 
A. I didn't tell him that. No man fell over because when they 
went and got the man from under the steering wheel he was still 
sitting up under it. 
Q. He wasn't sitting up like he was driving. 
A. I don't know how he was sitting but he was under the wheel. 
Q. Just ·about the way he was when you saw him last? 
A. I reckon he was, because I was hurt so bad then I didn't 
know how he was sitting. 
page 36 ~ By Mr. Williams: No questions from us. 
The witness stands aside. 
The witness, ODESSA HENDRICKS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. You are Miss Odessa Hendricks? 
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A. Yes., sir. 
Q. Miss Hendricks, you were in the back of the car with Mrs. 
Sallie Hendricks on the day of the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just look at the jury and tell them in your own way what 
you know about the accident and how i! happened. 
A. Well, I don't know anything about it only I just saw the car 
coming into us and I got down under the seat, down in the floor, 
and I couldn't tell you anything else because I just saw the car 
coming into us and I knew it was going to hit us and my sister 
drove off the road as far as she could get and I ducked down in 
the floor. . 
Q. She got over as far as she could get? \Vas she on the hard 
surface of the road when the car Mr. Johnson was driving struck 
the car you were in? · 
A. Sir? 
Q. \Vas your sister, Mrs. Ruby Tyler, on the hard surface or 
,~as part of her car on the dirt shot~lder? 
A. Part of it was on the dirt shoulder. 
page 37 ~ . Q. As far to her right as she could get? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why couldn't she get farther to the right? 
A. Well, if she had she would have gone into a ditch? 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. Were you watching the road? 
A. Well, I just saw the car when it was coming into us and I 
ducked dow.n in the floor. 
Q. Di9 you see the driver of the car? 
A. Yes, sir, I saw the driver. 
Q. When did you see him? How far across the road had his 
car gotten before you ducked? 
A. I don't know about how far· it was. 
Q. Had it started across the center of the road? 
A. It had started over on our side of the road. 
Q. How was the driver sitting in the seat? 
A. Sitting up straight when I saw him. 
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Q. How fast was your sister driving? 
A. I don't know about how fast she was driving. 
Q. Well, you have an idea. Was it fifty miles an hour? 
A. No, ·she wasn't going that fast. 
Q. Well, how fast do you think? 
A. Well, about twenty or twenty-five, I should say. Now, I 
don't know. 
Q. You think she was going about twenty or twenty-five miles 
an hour. How far ahead of you was this car when you 
page 38 ~ saw it going across the road? 
A. You mean Mr. Johnson's car? 
Q. fylr. Johnson's car. 
A. I don't know how far it was. 
Q. The distance of this room? 
Q. It might have been a little farther than that. 
Q. A little farther than the distance of this room when you first 
saw it start across the highway? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Williams: No questions. 
The witness stands aside. 
The witness, RUBY TYLER, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. Mrs. Tyler, I believe you were driving this car on May 21st, 
a Pontiac? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Look at the jury and tell them where you were when Mr. 
Johnson's car struck you and when you first saw him and all you 
know about it. 
A. Well, I don't know exactly how far he was from me when I 
first saw him. 
Q. Just look at the jury and tell them. You were coming 
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you? 
page 39 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Near Piney River? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And there was a slight curve? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, go ahead. 
A. \i\Then I first saw him he kept pulling on my side of the road 
where I was driving on my right and he kept pulling over in front 
of me and I was trying to get out of the way and I pulled almost off 
the highway and he hit me, and that is all I know. 
Q. Was part 9£ your car on the dirt shoulder of the road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On your right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \i\Thy didn't you go farther to the right? 
A. If I had went any farther I would have been in the ditch. 
Q. That was on a slight curve, was it? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The curve was to Mr. Johnson's right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Instead of turning to his right he came to your side and went 
straight? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Vv as Mrs. Dorothy Brooks in the car with you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 40 ~ Q. Do you know anything about her being injured? 
A. She was hurt, yes, sir. 
Q. vy en, what happened after she was hurt? 
A. Well, she fainted and then two fellows from Piney River 
brought her to the hospital. 
Q. Did you notice how she was hurt? 
A. Yes, sir, she had an awful gash on her face and hands. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. This is Mrs. Ruby Tyler? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Y Ott were driving the car? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVas Odessa Hendricks right when she said that the car 
started across the road when it was about the distance of this 
building away from you, something like fifty feet? 
A. I think just about that far. 
Q. How fast were you driving, Mrs. Tyler? 
A. I was driving about twenty miles an hour, I reckon. 
Q. Driving about twenty miles an hour? 
A. Might not have been making that because I slowed up there 
at the curve. 
Q. You slowed up at the curve and you saw this car something 
like sixty feet ahead of you. Did you make any effort to stop 
your car? 
A. I was trying to get off the highway because I knew he was 
going to run into me. 
page 41 } · Q. You saw from a distance of sixty feet that he was 
pulling over on your side of the road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you attempted to get off the highway but did not attempt 
to stop? . 
A. I put on the brakes. 
Q. Did you stop? 
A. I didn't come to a stop until he hit me. 
Q. Were you driving about the speed that Miss Hendricks said, 
about twenty to twenty-five miles an hour? 
A. Between twenty and twenty-five. 
Q. Not over that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How fast was the car that Mr. Johnson was driving going? 
A. He was going pretty fast when I first saw him, or saw his 
car. I never did see him. I was looking at the road. 
Q. You never saw him or his position in the car? 
A. No, I never did see him. 
Q. You don't know his position in the car? 
A. I was pulling over on my side of the road. . 
Q. You don't know whether he was up straight in the car? 
A. I didn't see him. 
Q. Or lying on the steering wheel? 
A. I never did see him. 
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Q. You never did see him? 
A. No. 
' ' 
Q. Did you stay around the car there after the acci-
page 42 ~ dent or did you go to the hospital? 
A. I went to the· hospital. 
The witness stands aside. 
DOROTHY BROOKS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. Mrs. Brooks, you are the plaintiff in this case? 
A. Yes, sir~ 
Q. Just tell the jury ·what happened and how this accident cam~ 
about. ' 
A. On May 21st, in Amherst County, this side of Piney River, 
we were coming towards Lynchburg whe~ a man, said to be 
Bernard Johnson, ran head-on into us. When I first saw his car 
it was forty or forty-five feet from us in the middle of the road 
and he kept pulling to his left and she was pulling to her right and 
I guess she would have gone into the ditch but he hit her before 
she got all the way off the road. Well, when the car hit it threw 
me against the dashboard, my hand going through the windshield, 
and I got out of the car, and I don't remember any more until they 
were carrying me to the hospital and there they taken forty-five 
stitches in my hand and face and I suffered right much because the 
place was pretty close to my eye on my face. I stayed in the hospital 
three days and I must have lost right much blood because I was 
too weak to get up and had to stay in bed a week after I came 
home. I lost six weeks from work. The doctor told 
page 43 ~ me he would have to operate on my finger again. Then 
he said it might not be all right after he operated on it 
and that worried me a whole lot. After I went back to work about 
four weeks my finger got so I could work it and use it a little but it 
is not exactly right, but tht; doctor said if I could use it he wouldn't 
·Gertrude Robsori Driver vs. Dorqthy Brooks. 63 
Dorothy ~roolu. 
go cutting into it again unless it was necessary or gave me more 
trouble. 
Q. Mrs. Brooks, show the jur:y your wrist, please. Is this ( indi-
cating on plaintiff's wrist) where it was cut? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you move this finger? 
A. I can bring it up but not all the way up. 
Q. He advised you that being as you have fairly good movement 
you won't have to have an operation? 
A. He thought the leader was cut and he would have to operate 
and sew the leader back together, and when I hold it way up it 
takes all the strength in my hand to do it. It rea1ly isn't like this 
Scl,me finger in the other hand. 
Q. And this is the scar on your right cheek that you received? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have any other cuts that have healed? 
A. I had a gash across my, nose here and a lot of small cuts up 
here on my other cheek but they healed without any stitches. 
Q. If you don't put any powder on your face does it look any 
worse? 
page 44 ~ A. Ye~, sir. 
Q. You try to fix it up? 
A. I always try to fix it up. 
Q. Do you remember going to the hospital? 
A. No, sir, I don't remember going to the hospital. 
Q. You fainted? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You were thrown against the dashboard of the car, I believe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the door come open? 
A. Not on my side. The driver came out on the driver's side. 
She was getting up out of the street when I got out from under 
the steering wheel. 
· Q. You were not thrown out of the car? 
A. No, I was not thrown out. 
Q. You know how much the doctors' bills are? 
A. Yes, sir, Dr: Hurt has charged me $25.00. The interne 
stitched my face and that was added into the hospital bill. 
Q. And that was what? · 
A. The interne taken the stitches in my face and that was added 
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to the hospital bill, which is about $18.00. 
By the Court: 
Q. You mean the whole bill? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Including the stitches taken by the doctor? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
page 45 ~ By Mr. Ward: 
Q. And then $25.00 for Dr. Hurt? 
A. Yes, sir, for Dr. Hurt attending to me. 
Q. How much do you make a week? 
A. Around $15.00 a week. 
Q. Do you know what it would cost to have a scar removed from 
your face? 
A. Well, I have been told I would have to go to a New York 
specialist--
By Mr. Williams (interposing): We object to what she has 
been told. 
By the Court: That is hearsay. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. Mrs. Brooks, where do you live? 
A. I live in Lynchburg. 
Q. What do you do? 
A. I am a fancy stitcher at Craddock-Terry Shoe Company. 
Q. How long have you been back to work? 
A. I went back in the middle of July. 
' Q. And have been working ever since? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You haven't lost any time since then, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you say your wages are about $15.00 a week? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You average $15.00 a week? 
page 46 ~ A. That is when I have regular work. Of course we 
· have been off from work and we don't average that when 
we haven't got the work. When I was off on account of this acci-
dent we were having plenty of work. That is the reason I went 
back. I wasn't really able to go but I was afraid they would give 
my machine away and I went back anyhow. 
Q. You went back to work when? 
A. In July. 
Q. Where were you sitting in the car? 
A. Sitting on the right hand side. 
Q. Front or back? 
A. Front seat. 
Q. Did you see the car coming? 
A. Yes, sir, I saw it coming and when I saw it it was in the 
middle of the road and I wouldn't say exactly how far away 
it was. 
Q. Would you think it was about the distance of this room? 
A. I don't think it was quite that far. 
Q. Something like forty-five or fifty feet? 
A. Just about, I reckon. 
Q. ·Did you call the driver's attention to the fact that this car 
was in the middle of the road? 
A. She knew it, I guess. I didn't think about telling her. 
Q. Was she stopping it at that time? 
A. She was going slow. ·she didn't exactly stop altogether but 
she wasn't driving over twenty miles an hour. 
page 47 ~- Q. You think not over twenty miles an hour. Did you 
see the driver of the other car? 
\ . A. Yes, sir, I dtd. 
Q. vVas he lying on the steering wheel? 
A. No, he was sitting with both hands on the steering wheel. 
His head was kind of drooped on his chest but he was not laying 
on the steering wheel. 
Q. Head dropped down on his chest? 
A. Yes, sir, kind of drooped forward. He had both hands on 
the steering wheel when I saw him. That was the first thing I was 
looking at when he. was coming toward us like that. 
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Q. And he had his eyes on the steering wheel ? 
A. I didn't pay any attention to his eyes but his head .wasn't held 
up like it ought to have been. 
Q. And after . the accident you fainted and were taken to the 
hospital? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how many weeks did you say you were off from work? 
A. Six weeks. 
Q. You were off from work six weeks; your doctor's bill was 
$25.00 and your hospital bill was $18.00? 
A. Yes, sir. : 
By Mr. Williams: No questions from us. 
The witness stands aside. 
By Mr. Ward: vVe rest our case. 
page 48 ~ By Mr. Williams: We would like t9 address a motion 
· to the court in the absence of the jury. 
Note: (The jury leaves the court room.) 
By Mr. Williams: Our motion is, if your honor please, that the 
plaintiff's evidence be stricken, as to the defendant, Driver's Sales 
& Service, on the ground that the evidence fails to show any con-
nection between this defendant, Driver's Sales & Service, and the 
alleged injury; that nothing has been proven whatever to establish 
. , any liability upon them, or any semblance of proof of the case 
stated in the notice of motion; in view of which fact we ask that 
the evidence be stricken as to this defendant. 
By Mr. Ward: If your Honor please, in plaintiff's motion for 
judgment she alleged on page 4, in the first paragraph : "The said 
Bernard Johnson was then and there driving the said Plymouth , 
automobile pursuant to his said instructions over and along said 
highway in the opposite direction, namely towards Waynesboro, 
Virginia, and the said Gertrude Robson Driver, by and through 
the said Bernard Johnson, then and there operated and con-
trolled and so operated and controlled at and during all of the 
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times herein mentioned and referred to · the said Plymouth auto-
mobile." The statute, I believe, is 6126, which I am sure 
page 49 ~ your Honor is familiar with, requires the defendant to 
file an affidavit denying the control of any instrumentarity 
with the pleadings which puts that fact in issue. No pleading was 
filed until this morning and your Honor asked if we were at issue 
and Mr. Williams then said he filed a plea of the general issue, or 
not guilt, and our Honor instructed Mr. Sandidge to enter such 
plea for him. I haven't waived it. I haven't said anthing about it 
and haven't taken issue on that point because it is not necessary. 
I have a perfect right to rely on his failure to file this affidavit. 
By Mr. Williams. In reply, may I call your Honor's attention to 
these considerations? On page 2, of his notice of motion the plain-
tiff says: "that the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, by and 
through her officers and agents, negligently and without the use of 
ordinary care handed a set of dealer's license .plates to Bernard 
Johnson and instructed him in' effect, if not literally, to go to 
Bedford, Virginia, and put said license plates on a certain Ply-
mouth automobile not then owned by Gertrude Robson Driver." 
He has alleged that this defendant, Driver's Sales and Service, 
did not own the automobile in question. The possibility of the 
situation he now presents under 6126 came under our considera-
tion, but in view of his direct allegation in his notice of 
page
1 
50 ~ motion that this defendant did not own that automobile, 
then, of course, we took the position in our · own minds 
that it was not necessary to go beyond or to show any different 
case from that alleged. Now, he alleges there that this defendant 
did not own the automobile but that she handed this set of license 
plates to the defendant Johnson. His case here is based upon two 
things. The first one is that by lending or handing this set of 
license plates to the defendant Johnson the defendant Driver made 
Johnson her agent for the transaction of her business: You will 
note he said "directed him to go to Bedford, Virginia-driving a 
car that did not belong to Gertrude Robson Driver." He makes 
that statement, "not then owned by her." In the second place, he 
says, "As a result of this loan of license tags there is an estoppel 
upon the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, to say it was not 
upon her mission or transaction of her business." ,Consequently,_ 
in view of his allegation that the car wasn't owned by her, what he 
has said about the operation of the car is but a conclusion of law, 
· not a statement of fact. What he. has said about the operation of 
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the car grows' out of any instructions that might have been given 
or any business that might have been attended to. Here we have 
a case of proof this morning in which there is not even a 
page 51 ~ statement that Gertrude Robson Driver's license tags were 
on the car. There is simply proof of the fact there was a 
collision by a car driven by the defendant, Johnson, and that is all; 
not a thing about who owned the car and there is his own allegation 
that it was not owned by the defendant, Driver, so one must, of 
course, resort to conjecture as to what is the legal connection be-
tween the two operations. Now, if we get into the question of use 
of license tags that opens up other questions of law, but simply upon 
the evidence adduced here today we submit that there is first of all 
no obligation on us to put the fact in issue under 6126 when his 
own allegation is she did not own the car, and in the ·second place 
the evidence shows no connection whatever between Mrs. Driver and 
the negligence co~plained of. 
l3y Mr. ·ward: The statute, 6126, I don't recall the exact words, 
Sa)fs: "Where a bill, declaration or other pleadings alleges that any 
pertson, corporation, and so forth, owned, operated or controlled 
any property or instrumentality no proof of the fact alleged shall 
be ;required unless an affidavit be filed with the pleadings putting it 
in issue, denying specifically and with particularity that such prop-
erty or instrumentality was at the time alleged so owned, operated 
or controlled." 
page 52 ~ By the Court : What is your allegation on that point? 
By Mr. Ward: "The said Gertrude Robson Driver by and 
through the said Bernard Johnson then and there operated and 
controlled and so operated and controlled at and during all the times 
herein mentioned and referred to the said Plymouth automobile." 
It isn't ne~essary that she own it at all. The statute doesn't say 
"owned, operated and controlled" but "owned, operated or con-
trolled." Now, it clearly isn't .necessary for anyone to own any-
thing. If you have control of it that is sufficient. Mr. Williams 
mentioned the license tags. He is the one that brought those into it. 
I don't think it is necessary for the plaintiff to do anything what-
soever. 
By M·r. Williams: Your allegation of license tags is in the notice. 
of motion. 
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By Mr. V\T arcl: There are a lot of things in there that I did not 
attempt to prove. I could not prove they knew he was subject to 
fainting spells, but it isn't necessary. I don't have to prove that 
which is surplusage, and anytime you allege anybody is agent you 
don't have to prove it if they don't file the proper affidavit. 
page 53 ~ I didn't say they lent him the license tags. It is nowhere 
in here and if it is I ask Mr. Williams to point it out. 
What I did say was that the Driver Sales and Service handed him a 
set and told him to go to Bedford and bring the car back here and 
not deviate from that route. I don't know if that .is the exact 
language but I am sure that is in there at some place; that they 
told him to go and get this car and bring it back and came back 
the most direct route. I didn't say "lent him the tags." I didn't say 
they were estopped to plead that. I don't think there is any estoppel 
in it. In order to be estoppel ·it must be something that the plaintiff 
relied on to her prejudice. I haven't used the. word "estoppel" and I 
don't think there is any estoppel. I thought Mr. \Villiams might file 
the affidavit. I didn't know. I thought he would at first. I will say 
I am surprised in one way that he didn't do it. I don't see how any-
body can say they are entirely surprised when a defendant doesn't do 
it but I think I have a right to rely on it and I didn't know what 
they were going to do. As a matter of fact, off the record--
Note: ( After some further discussion off the record the court 
made the following ruling:) 
By the Court : Gentlemen, when the legislature enacted that 
statute there they certaiilly meant s0111dhing by it and I 
page 54 ~ think that where a pleading makes an allegation such as 
is made in this case alleging agency or ownership and 
operation and control of an automobile, before a defendant can 
rely upon a motion such as this they must with the pleadings putting 
it issue deny it by an affidavit. Unless they do that then the allega-
tions of that pleading are taken and accepted to be true and no proof 
thereof is required. I do not think that this defendant, Mrs. Driver, 
or the Driver's Sales & Service, have brought themselves within the 
purview of that statute in any manner, shape or form, and there-
fore this motion will have to be overruled. 
By Mr. Williams: We note an exception, if your Honor please. 
Note: ( The jury returns into the court room.) 
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'By Mr. 'Williams: If your Honor please, we propose to show by 
the defendant the facts growing out of the issue which we took to 
the plaintiff's notice of motion on our plea of not guilty. 
By Mr. Ward: Your Honor please, he hasn't asked any question 
yet but I understand he intends to contradict the agency and I 
object to all the evidence along that line. 
By the Court: I don't know what he is going to ask. 
page 55 ~ By Mr. Williams: The testimony will be in line with 
my opening statement. · 
By the Court ( addressing the jury) : Gentlemen, suppose you go 
back into that room there for a few minutes. 
Note: (The jury retires from the court room.) 
The witness, D. E. LAMB, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies in the absence of the jury 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q. You work for Driver's Sales & Service? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what are your duties, Mr. Lamb? 
A. I am floorman and I attend to cars being repaired and wait 
on everything in get)eral. 
Q. Who owns the business, Mr. Lamb? 
A. Mrs. Gertrude Robson Driver. 
Q. Is she at all active in connection with the business? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who is actively in charge and responsible for the conduct of 
the business ? 
A. Mr. Schwab. He is the manager and I am the assistant 
manager. 
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Q. Mr. Lamb, do you know Mr. Johnson, the defendant in this 
case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
page 56 ~ A. A little over a year. 
Q. Has he ever had occasion to come to your garage? 
A. Yes, sir, I have waited on his car and serviced it with gas and 
oil and he has had mechanical work done on his car there. 
Q. To your knowledge did he prior to May 21st last di"ive an 
automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Up to that time had anything come to your attention show-
ing that he was not physically or mentally capable of driving a car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you ev~r seen him drive a car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It is alleged in the notice of motion, Mr. Lamb, that on May 
21st, 1939, your company handed him a set of dealer's license 
plates and instructed him to go to Bedford and put those license 
plates on a certain Plymouth automobile not then owned by the 
said Gertrude Robson Driver, which was without license plates, 
and drive the Plymouth to the place of business of Mrs. Driver in 
vVaynesboro. Do you know anything about that? 
A. No, sir, we didn't direct him to go. We lent him a set of 
license plates. 
Q. How did the question come up? 
A. He came by there along about the first part of the Vfeek 
before May 21st and said he had his car in Bedford and his 
1938 tags were on it; that if we would let him have a set 
page 57 ~ of dealer's tags to go and get it--
By Mr. Ward (interposing): I want to ohject to that testimony 
that they would lend him dealer's tags because that wouldn't make 
him any agent. That goes to deny agency. 
By the Court: I don't think you can deny the question of agency 
in this case now. If that could be done you might just as well 
ignore the statute entirely. That, as I understand it, is the purpose 
of that statute. In other words, the agency, operation and control 
of a machine or vehicle, motor vehicle, is put is issue by the plead-
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ings and if it is not denied by the affidavit it is accepted as true and 
no proof of that is necessar:y. 
By Mr. Williams: May I again call your Honor's attention to 
the fact that the allegation is that the machine was not owned by 
Mrs. Driver and that she handed him a set of license plates and 
directed him to do that? 
By the Court: You can show that the allegations of his notice 
of motion are not true but you cannot undertake to deny the control 
and agency of this man for Driver's Sales & Service. 
By Mr. Williams: Am I at liberty to allow this witness to pro-
ceed with what transpired between him and Mr. Johnson? 
page 58 } By the Court: Yes, you may proceed. The jury is 
not here. 
By Mr. Ward: I want to add a little to that. My notice said: 
handed him said license plates." 
By the Court : I understand from the language of your notice of 
motion, which seems perfectly clear to me, that you allege in there 
that Bernard Johnson was agent of the Driver's Sales & Service 
and that he was operating and controlling that car, or that that 
company was controlling and operating that car through him as 
their agent. Now, is there no denial by affidavit of those allegations. 
By Mr. Williams: May I add one word? I have no desire, of 
course, to prolong the argument unduly but I do wish your Honor 
to see our contention here which is this; that his notice of motion 
contains allegations of facts which we, by our plea of not guilty, 
have denied. Now, if he had simply alleged in his notice of motion 
that this plaintiff was struck by an automobile which was then and 
there owned, operated and controlled by this defendant that would 
be one case, but on the other hand he has alleged a case in which 
he has stated certain facts, which I have read to your honor, and I 
have filed a plea of not guilty. That, to my mind, raises 
page 59 } the question: "\i\That is the purpose of this statute?" I 
believe one of the judges in the Court of Appeals has 
said that the purpose of this statute is not to trap the unwary but 
simply to eliminate, for purposes of experiency, the necessity of 
putting the plaintiff to prove facts which would necessarily lie in 
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the knowledge of the defendant and which the plaintiff may not 
be able to prove. 
By the Court: What particular fact in the notice of motion is 
there that you wish to disprove? You can't, under that statute, dis-
prove agency. You can't, under that statute, in the present con-
dition of the pleadings, disprove the control and operation of that 
car through this agent on the part of the Driver's Sales & Service. 
By Mr. vVilliams: If your Honor will' indulge us for a few 
moments we will submit to your Honor authority which will show 
that where these facts are not so much in evidence by the plaintiff, 
so that, in effect, the introduction--
By the Court (interposing) : Which facts? 
By Mr. Williams: Particulars of agency. 
By the Court: The trouble is they haven't put a single, 
page 60 ~ solitary scintilla of evidence in here .. That is the point. 
They have alleged it but there isn't any evidence and the 
purpose of the statute is to say when they allege it they don't have 
to prove it. 
By Mr. \Villiams: Let's take it on the allegations-my contention 
is where he makes these allegations of facts to which the defendant 
takes issue, to the extent that those allegations of facts are par-
ticularized in his notice of motion, to that extent the defendant 
also is entitled to come forward and show evidence. I am simply 
relying on my recollection but if your honor will indulge us to that 
extent I think our proceeding may be facilitated to that extent. 
By the Court: I will give you all the time you want. 
Note: (At this point counsel for_ the defendants retired into the 
office of the Commonwealth's Attorney, and after a short time 
-returned into court.) 
By Mr. Williams: Your Honor, I confess my inability to find 
anything for the moment to add anything to what I have stated to 
the court. For that reason I think, reserving my exception to your 
Honor's ruling, it might be in order for this defendant, Mr. John-
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son, to proceed with his defense, and in order to complete the 
record, if, at the conclusion of it all the record should show what 
these defendants would testify to in the absence of the 
page 61 ~ jury I can put them on and get those facts in the record, 
of course, subject to your Honor's ruling. 
By the Court: Very well. Call the jury in. 
Note: (The witness, D. E. Lamb, stands aside, and the jury 
returns into the court room. 
The defendant, BERNARD JOHNSON, 
having been duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. This is Mr. Bernard J 6hnson? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Johnson, where do you live? 
A. Waynesboro. 
Q. How long have you lived in Waynesboro? 
A. Since March, 1938. 
Q. Where are you employed? 
A. At Augusta Dry Cleaning Company. 
Q. How long have you beet1 employed there? 
A. Ever since I have been in Waynesboro. 
Q. What are your duties, Mr. Johnson? 
A. Well, I a111 cleaner and I also spot. 
Q. Just tell the jury in your own words what that means. 
A. Well, a cleaner takes the clothes in and examines them for 
bad spots and stains and then goes ahead and proceeds to dry clean 
them and in dry cleaning it doesn't remove sweet spots or 
page 62 ~ bad stains and after they come out I have to use different 
chemicals to remove these different spots or stains. 
Q. Now, what is the process that you, go through with? I mean 
by that, do you use a machine? Do you work over a machine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury the type of work that is. 
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A. I have a dry cleaning machine, something on the order of a 
washing machine, that I have to put these clothes in and then I 
start it to operating. It operates for thirty minutes.· Then I have 
to stop it and. takes the clothes out and put them in another machine 
that acts on the same principle as a w.ringer. That machine takes 
all the solvent out and I have to then take theiri out of that and 
put them in a deodorizer that takes all the odor entirely out of the 
garments. · 
Q. Now, Mr. Johnson, prior. to this accident that you had with 
Mrs. Brooks on May 21st had you worked there at the plant any 
that week? 
A. I worked the four preceding days before the accident. 
Q. You worked Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you just tell the jury there in your own words your 
maneuvers on the day of this accident, when you left Waynesboro 
and where you went. 
A. Well, I got up that morning about five o'clock. It was on 
Sunday morning. 
Q. Before that, when did you contact the Driver's Sales and 
Service? 
page 63 ~ A. It was on vVednesday preceding the accident. That 
was the first day I went back to work. 
Q. Then on Saturday you went back to the Driver's Sales and 
Service? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What transpired when you borrowed these license plates, or 
obtained them? 
A. What do you mean, the first time? 
Q. Yes, and the second time also. 
A. Well, I asked Mr. Lamb if it was possible for me to get a set 
of dealer's tags. I had spoken to him once or twice before that on 
a trade, about trading--
By Mr. Ward (interposing): Your Honor please, I object to 
that line of testimony on the ground it has nothing to do with his 
defense and would simply go to disprove agency-anything about 
lending him the tags or anything that transpired in the conversation 
there. 
By the Court: I understand, Mr. Ward~ that the defense, judg-
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i ng from the opening statement of counsel, is based upon the 
contention of an unavoidable accident that grew out of the physical 
or mental condition of this defendant, and I think you would have 
the right to show the surrounding facts and circumstances showing 
this transaction and that might-but I will not express myself 
before the jury further than that. I think that evidence is im-
material. 
page 64 ~ By Mr. Ward: I don't want to be in position of having 
waived my objection to any testimony as to agency. 
By the Court : You are not doing that. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. I went to Mr. Lamb and I told him my car was in Bedford 
and I hadn't got 1939 registration tags and that the car had been 
over there since Easter, and I told him that I wanted to trade and 
that I didn't see any use of going ahead and buying regist.ration 
tags for that car and then come back and trade for something, 
maybe heavier, and then have to go through all that transfer, writing 
. up other papers and things, and I asked him if it would be possile 
for me to get a set of dealer's tags to bring the car back over there 
so that they could appraise it and see just what I could get on it, 
and he said, "I think so." He said, "If we are not using them." 
He said, "You come by Saturday." 
Q. Did you go by there Saturday? 
_ A. vYes, sir. 
Q. What transpired on Saturday? 
A. Saturday evening I went by and asked him and he said, "I 
think we have got a set here that we can let you have." So they 
let me have them. 
Q. Now, did Driver's Sales & Service give you any instructions 
in regard to these license plates? 
A. No, I don't recollect any instructions. 
·page 65 ~ Q. Then you took them home with you and then the 
next morning you caught the train from vVaynesboro to 
Roanoke. 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Tell the jury what happened from there. 
Ai As I said, I got up about five o'clock and caught the train 
from Waynesboro at six o'clock. I got to Bedford a little after 
eleven. I don't know exactely what time the train gets there. Those 
were the only connections I could make and I got my car, got the 
tags on, gas and oil and water in it and at that time it was about 
time for. lunch. My brother lives right there in town so I thought 
I would go over to my brother's and take dinner and before I 
started back I did go over and take dinner with him and sat around 
and talked for maybe half an hour, maybe longer, just sitting 
around talking and there were two or three people I hadn't seen for 
a little time and I visited several homes but never got out of the 
car-just stopped in front of their houses and talked to them for 
five or ten minutes, or something like that, and then I started back 
and got over here. In speaking of this curve, there is another curve 
just before you reach this one. I remember making that curve 
very well and then there is a little straight stretch and this other 
curve veers to the right again, but I never remember seeing that 
curve or the car approaching and I don't remember the impact or 
anything from then on until after I regained consciousness. 
Q. Whose car was this you were driving? · 
A. My own. 
Q. Mr.Johnson, you testify you were unconscious and 
page 66 ~ don't remember the wreck? 
A. No, sir, I don't remember it. 
Q. Were you badly injured yourself? 
A. Very much so. 
Q. Did you receive those scars there in that wreck? 
A. Those scars across there and across my forehead and on each 
side of my face. 
Q. Had you made any deal with the Driver's Sales and Service? 
A. No positive deal. 
By Mr. Ward: Your Honor please, I think that is certainly 
inadmissible and irrelevant and has no bearing on the issues 
made up. 
By the Court: No, I don't think so, but I don't see any harm to it. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. WillJams : 
Q. Mr. Johnson, I believe you said that it was on the Wednesday 
before this accident that you first saw Mr. Lamb about borrowing 
these dealer's tags. 
A. Yes, sir, I am pretty sure it was. 
Q. And at that time you asked him for the loan· of them? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You said nothing to him nor brought anything to his notice 
or attention concerning your ability to drive a car, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
page 67 ~ Q. Nothing was said about that whatever? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was anything said about the rote that you were to go or 
come in connection with bringing this car back? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Simply loaned you the tags at your request? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. And when· you went to them on Saturday then you saw Mr. 
Lamb and Mr. Schwab? 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. And nothing was said then about your physical condition 
or ability to drive a car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You went to Bedford that day, I believe? 
A. The next morning. 
Q. The next morning, Sunday, and you decided which route 
you would take coming back, did you ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Johnson, you had a driver's permit at that time, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And on both of the occasions when you saw Mr. L~1mb and 
the second time when you saw Mr. Schwab nothing was said what-
ever about the route you would take coming back? 
A. No, sir. 
Gertrude Robson Driver vs. Dorothy Brooks. 79 
Bernard Johnson. 
Q. But you were supposed to get back on Sunday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did they give you a piece of paper or permit show-
page 68 ~ ing the use of the tags? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was solely for your purpose? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Ward: Your Honor, I don't want to slow up the case 
and object to every question. J think I have already made myself 
clear but I don't want to be in the position of waiving my objections 
by allowing the testimony to come in without objection. I don't 
think I have to object to each question but I want the record to 
show I object to all of Mr. Williams' questions, which might prove 
or tend to prove agency, or lack of agency. 
By the Court: I don't think there has been any question asked 
along that line. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. Mr. Johnson, you fainted about five days before this accident, 
didn't you? 
A. Well now, I wouldn't say that I fainted. 
Q. Do you remember in the Trial Justice's Court here before 
Mr. Otto Evans' assistant who was trying the case on a charge of 
reckless driving-do you remember testifying on that occasion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you on that occasion testify that you had 
page 69 ~ fainted four or five days before this accident and.that you 
had gone to a doctor and that that doctor had told you 
that you had a brain injury and should stay in bed at least four 
or five days and that you disregarded this doctor's orders and got 
up and drove this car? 
A. I testified that on the preceding Monday that I had a fall. 
I had a carbunkle on my left ankle and I went back to work and it 
was giving me trouble at this time and I had fell. Now, I don't 
remember whether I fainted or not. It is possible that I did. 
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Q. What I asked you, Mr. Johnson, whether you did or not, 
didn't you say in the Trial Justice's Court, tried in this very room, 
that you fainted? 
A. I said I must have fainted. 
By the Court : 
Q. At what time? 
By Mr. Ward: Four or five days before the accident. 
Q. You did say you fainted in the Trial Justice's Court. 
A. I did. That was on Monday preceding the accident. 
Q. And he said for you to stay in bed at least four or five days, 
the doctor? 
A. He said three to four days. 
Q. Didn't you say at least four or five days when you were in 
the Trial Justice's Court? 
A. I don't know as I said four or five. I might have. 
Q. This doctor told you that you did have a brain injury? 
A. He said I had a slight brain injury. 
page 70 r Q. And did he tell you what kind. of brain injury? 
A. ~o. 
Q. He just told you you had a brain injury? 
A. He just said rest up and take it easy for four or five days .. 
Q. Did you take it easy? Didn't you get up earlier than he 
told you and had a very strenuous day. on the day of this accident? 
A. No, I didn't have any unnecessarily strenuous day that day. 
Q. Hadn't you been working on all this dry cleaning? 
A. I stayed in bed the rest of Monday, that night, all day Tues-
day, Tuesday night and I woke up Wednesday morning and I felt 
just as good as lever did in my life and I told my wife, I said, 
"I believe I will go to work. I feel all right" and I went back to 
work and worked the balance of the week, which was four days. 
Q. What time did you get up Sunday morning? 
A. About five o'clock. 
Q. Didn't you call a witness here to testify in the Trial Justice's 
Court by the name of E. S. Stratton and didn't that witness testify 
you were subject to fainting spells? 
A. He did. 
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By Mr. Franklin: I object to that. 
By the Court: I don't think it proper, Mr. \,Vard, to 
page 71 ~ ask this witness what some other witness testified to in a 
hearing before another court. 
By Mr. Ward: I wouldn't either except he offered him as his 
own witness. 
By the Court: I don't think that will change it. You will have 
to bring that witness. 
By Mr. Ward: He tried himself to show he was subject to 
fainting spells on that occasion. 
By the Court: Y 011 can ask him that fact, whether or not he 
undertook to show it. 
By Mr. \tVard: 
Q. Didn't' you undertake to show in the Trial Justice's Court on 
the occasion I mentioned that you were subject to fainting spells? 
A. No, not pecessarily. 
Q. What do you mean by that, Mr. Johnson? You offered evi-
dence of that, didn't you?. 
A. Well now, can I say something? 
By the Court: Answer the question in your own way. 
A. What I wanted to say was this: Speaking of the man I work 
for. I had never fainted in his presence. I have fainted 
page 72 ~ at least five times in my life but that wouldn't necessarily 
mean that I was subject to fainting spells, and he knew 
of that. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. Who knew of it? 
A. Eddie knew of it, the man I worked for, the man that testi-
fied, and naturally not knowing he would have testified to that. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin : 
Q. Mr. Johnson, in what condition were you when you were 
here at the Trial Justice's Court? 
A. I was in mighty bad condition. . 
Q. What happened right after the a~cident or rather, right after 
that trial? Where did you go from the court room? 
A. I went rtght straight back to Bedford and went to the hospital. 
Q. And what kind of operation did you have? 
A. Had appendicitis operation that night. 
Q. Something has been said about fainting spells. You said you 
fainted five times in your whole life? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When were they? 
A. The last one was at least five years ago and then it came from 
a carbuncle or boil. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 73 ~ The witness, DR. J. W. WALTERS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. This is Dr. J. W. Walters of Lynchburg? , 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Doctor, on the 21st day of May, 1939, did you witness an 
accident or collision between two cars, one driven by a man by the 
name of Bernard Johnson and one driven by a Mrs. Tyler? 
A. Yes, sir. I was coming in this direction. I was following the 
car driven by the lady. I followed her from. the bridge up the hill. 
She was not driving very fast but I was making about forty-five 
miles an hour and gaining on her right rapidly, and just as I got 
to the top of the hill-I suppose I was seventy-five yards behind 
her-I saw this car coming up the hill from this direction. It was 
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on a curve, and the car drive~ by Mr. Johnson was very .close to the 
edge of the road. In fact it was just hugging the curve. In fact 
the wheel next to the curve was possibly on the margin of the 
macadam and I saw him coming and his head was bowed down 
overt.he wheel, and I thought there was something wrong with him, 
evidently. 
By the Court: 
Q. That was before they struck? 
A. Before they struck, and then all of a sudden his car just 
jumped and came right across the road and the lady drew 
page 74 ~ way over to her side of the road. She was in fact practi-
cally off the road and this car came right across and ran 
into her. 
By Mr. Franklin: 
Q. Did you examine Mr. Johnson after the accident? 
A. Y e's, sir. His head was cut and bleeding and he was consider-
ably shocked, and we got him out of the car and just laid him in 
the ditch on the side. I helped the yound ladies first to get out. 
Then I went down to where he was, and I saw the man was 
terribly shocked. Well, as you know, on those occasions people all 
coming by want to do something, and they wanted to take this man 
on to the hospital, but I knew that he was in no condition to go to 
the hospital ; that he was so badly shocked and his pulse was so bad 
that if they raised him up in the car he might have died before 
they got him to the hospital. So I kept him lying there in the drain 
and we bandaged his head and stopped it from bleeding until he 
was sufficiently recovered so someone could take him to the hospital. 
Q. Then, Dr. Walters, before he got off of the right side of the 
road he was slumped even before that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He was slumped down then? 
A. Yes, sir, I could see him before he came up. His head was 
clown, oh, half way the windshield, and hanging over the wheel. 
Q. And then this car just veered across the highway? 
A. Came almost across in this direction (indicating). As though 
this were the road, he came almost like that. Wha:t I think 
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page 7 5 ~ happened was the wheel struck the rough edge of the road 
and he had no control and just shot across. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Dr. Walters, was this curve you speak of to Mr. Johnson's 
right or to his left? 
A. It was to Mr. Johnson's right and he was on the short side 
of the curve. . 
Q. And when you saw him he was on his right side of the road? 
A. Oh, he was right up against it-in fact, his wheel was almost 
on the margin of the madacam. 
Q. Did his car simply stop curving and go straight or did it 
turn left? 
A. It definitely turned left. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ward: 
Q. Did Mr. Johnson make any statement to you, Dr. Walters? 
A. He was in no condition to make a statement. 
Q. You say you think his wheel struck the rough edge of the 
road? 
A. It appeared that something of that sort happened and then 
he just shot across the road. 
The ·witness stands aside. 
By Mr. Franklin: Your Honor please, I rest for Bernard 
Johnson. 
By the Court: Any further evidence? 
page 76 ~ · By Mr. \i\Tilliams: Your Honor knows of the evidence 
we should like to introduce which, I take it, in order to 
complete the record, would be introduced in the absence of the jury. 
Nate : ( The jury is sent from the court room.) 
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The witness, D. E. LAMB, 
testifies out of the presence of the jury, as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Mr. Lamb, you work for Driver's Sales & Service? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe you say that your duties are in connection with 
the running of the place, supervising the repair of cars. 
By Mr. Ward: May I interrupt? I thought you might agree and 
let the record show that I object to all this testimony. 
By Mr. \i\Tilliams. I so understand that and I think the record 
will show it is in the absence of the jury which will itself proclaim 
the fact. 
Q. How long have you known Mr. Johnson, the other defendant 
in this case? 
A. Over a year. 
Q. Has he patronized your garage? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 77 ~ Q. To what extent? 
A. He has bought gas and oil from us and had his car 
services there in the shop. 
Q. To your knowledge did he drive an automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you seen him drive? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Up to May 21st, the da~ of this accident, had anything come 
to your attention to show that he was not physically or mentally 
capable of driving a car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you seen him drive? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. I believe you stated though you had never ridden with him? 
A. No, sir .. 
Q. Mr. Lamb, is it true that your company lent Mr. J oh_nson 
dealer's tags or plates for use? 
~\. Yes, sir. 
Q. Hmiv did that come about? 
A. He had been around a few times having hjs car serviced and 
I asked him how about trading his old car off for a better one 
sometime ago, and then on Wednesday before he had this wreck 
he came by and said his car was at Bedford; had '38 tags on it; 
that he hadn't bought any '39 tags yet, and if we would lend him 
tags to go bring it in he would bring it in and try to trade with 
us. He didn't want to buy tags fo~ the old car and have the extra 
expense. 
page 78 } Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him if we had tags that weren't being used 
then probably we would let him have them, so on Saturday he came 
back and I took his to Mr. Schwab, the Manager, and told Mr. 
Schwab what he said and Mr. Schwab said that was all right. So 
we lent him a set of tags. 
. Q. Did you give him a paper writing at the time? 
A. Gave· him a permit for the use of the tags. 
- Q. At that time was Mr. Johnson, to your knowledge, physically 
and mentally unfit to drive an autom_obile? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was his mind unimpaired as far as you knew? 
A. I thought he was all right. 
Q. To your knowledge was. he suffering ~vith a brain injury or 
subject to fainting spells? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or rundown, weakened condition physically and mentally? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or was there anything to put Jou on notice if Mr. Johnson 
drove a car it was reasonably probable and likely that he would 
have an accident ? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you heard of anything in the nature of unusual driving 
or unusual behavior on his part that would suggest he was unfit? 
· A. No, sir. 
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Q. Did you give him any instructions about going to 
page 79 ~ Bedford and putting the !icense plates on a· certain auto-
mobile not then owned by Mrs. Driver and to drive that 
automobile to your place of business in Waynesboro without deviat-
ing from the most direct route from Bedford to Waynesboro? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or did you tell him to drive it that way and not drive it for 
any other purpose than removing it from Bedford to Waynesboro? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or give him any such instructions at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 'was anything said about the details of his return or the route 
he would take ? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or the time he would arrive? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or his speed ? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you attempt or did you exercise or attempt to exercise 
any control over him or give him any orders? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have any understanding with him at all about a 
trade in? . 
A .. We had a car he had looked at. He asked me the price of the 
car and I told him the price of it and that is as far as it went. 
Q. Had you agreed to trade his car? 
A. No, sir, not without seeing it. 
page 80 ~ Q. You hadn't fixed the price? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. At that time was Mr. Johnson in your employ? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you any reason to believe it was illegal for you to lend 
him the license plates? 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Ward: No cross examination. 
By the Court : Now, gentlemen, it seems to me from these state-
ments here, or the evidence of this witness, that you have several 
statements from him that are admissible and would be proper in 
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this case. There may be a few statements tending to show the lack 
of agency or tending to show the lack of the operation or control 
of this car on the part of the company that would not be· admissible. 
It seems to me that the best and proper thing to do here would be 
to let this witness testify and instruct the jury that they cannot 
consider this evidence as disproving any question of agency or the 
control and operation of this car on the part of the Driver's Sales & 
Service. 
By Mr. Ward: If your Honor.please, if there is any evidence in 
there that does not go to disprove agency I don't know 
page 81 ~ what it is. I don't mean to disagree with your Honor but 
could you point out what part of it is admissible? 
By the Court: For example, Mr. \i\Tard, their defense is that 
this was an unavoidable accident and whether or not they acted 
judiciously in employing this man or assuming responsibility for 
his acts as an agent. He says there was nothing to put him on 
notice. He had seen him drive a car and he appeared to be capable 
of operating a car and he knew of no reason ,11.rhy he couldn't prop-
erly operate and control that car. Now, that seems to me, in view 
of this defense-taking into consideration all of your contentions 
for the lack of this defendant to file an affidavit which would 
p·rotect you-yet on the other hand his statement about the com-
pany not giving him control to operate this car and direct what 
route he should go, ·which vvould tend to prove agency, would, I 
think, be inadmissible. I will let this witness be interrogated and 
you can object to the questions as asked and answered. 
By Mr. \i\Tard: I have found out since going over to \,Vaynes-
boro that I cannot prove that they knew he was incompetent to 
drive a car and I am willing to strike that out of the notice of 
motion and if I do that there is no use for them to disprove some-
thing I am willing to strike out." I won't say anything 
page 82 ~ aboi1t it in my argument and I didn't say anything about 
it in my opening statement because I couldn't prove it 
and I am perfectly willing to strike all of that out in the notice of 
motion. I alleged that hoping I would get some evidence that they 
knew he was subject to fainting. 
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By the Court: I expect the best thing to do, is to let this witness 
be examined and object to the questions as they arise. Call the jury 
back. 
Note: (The jury returns into the court room.) 
The witness, D. E. LAMB, 
testifies before the jury, as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. 'Williams: 
Q. You are Mr. D. E. Lamb? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For whom do you work? · 
A. Driver's Sales & Service. 
Q. ·who is the owner of Driver's Sales & Service. 
A. Mrs. Gertrude Robsori Driver. 
Q. Does she have any active control or connection with the 
business? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Lamb, what are your duties, generally? 
A. I work at front, the gasoline station at front. 
page 83 ~ I sell Dodge and Plymouth cars or help sell some cars, 
give service when the customers come in, and everything 
in general. 
Q. Who is the responsible head of the business? 
A. Mr. Schwab. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Bernard Johnson, the defendant in this 
case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
A. Over a year. 
Q. Has he had occasion to come to your garage? 
A. Yes, sir, he has been coming to that garage, bought gas and 
oil and had his car inspected there, and things like that. 
Q. Prior to last May, to your knowledge, did he drive an 
automobile? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Up to that time had anything come to your attention showing 
that he was not physically or mentally capable of driving a car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you ever seen him drive? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Lamb, there is an allegation in the notice of motion that 
on, May 21st Mr. Johnson was physically and mentally unfit to 
drive an automobile; that he was suffering with a brain injury; was 
subject to fainting spells and in a run down condition and weak-
ened condition both physically and mentally and because 
page 84 ~ of his physical condition it was reasonably probable and 
likely 'that he would have an accident if he undertook to 
drive an automobile. Please state whether or not anything had 
come to your attention that wottld make you suspect or put you on 
notice of any such condition on the part of Mr. Johnson. 
A. There certainly had not. 
Q. The notice of motion further alleges that on May 21st Mrs. 
Driver handed Mr. Johnson a set of dealer's license plates and 
instructed him to go to Bedford and put them on a certain auto-
mobile. Please state how that--
By Mr. Ward (interposing): I object to that. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Let me finish the question. Please state as to what extent; 
that is true, if at all? 
By Mr. Ward: I object to that question as tending to disprove 
agency: 
By the Court: Any objection to getting his answer in the record? 
By Mr. Shrader: He has got it in the record and we object to 
getting it in the record in this way. It was put in the record while 
the jury was out. · 
By the Court: I think your objection is sustained as to that 
question. 
By Mr. Williams: We note an exception. That is an 
page 85 ~ allegation of the notice of motion and under o·ur plea of 
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not guilty we should have the opportunity of going into . 
the actual facts under those circumstances. 
By the Court: You may let the witness answer that question. I 
am going to meet this situation with a proper instruction at the 
proper time. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q. Did Mr. Johnson come to see you in the week preceding the 
accident? 
A. Yes, sir, he came on Wednesday and told me he had a car in 
Bedford that broke down .on Easter and he would like to go and 
get it; that his 1938 license tags had expired and wanted to know 
if we had a set of dealer's tags we would let him use to go and get 
it and try to trade us for a better car, and I told him if we had 
tags' unused on Saturday we would let him have them. Saturday 
evening he came in and I took him to the manager, Mr. Schwab, 
and Mr, Schv\rab said, "Yes, let him have a set." 
Q. At that time did you have any understanding with him about 
trading in this automobile? 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. That was to be attended to later when he brought the car 
back? 
A. After he brought the car back. 
Q. So when he came in on Saturday you lent him the license 
tags? 
page 86 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Shrader: Your Honor understands the same objection 
applies to all these questions. 
· By the Court: I can't take it that way. You had better make 
your objection. In this situation I can't assume that a general 
objection applies to all of these questions because the evidence is too 
much intermingled. I am going to reach this situation by a proper 
instruction at the proper time. 
By Mr. Shrader : We object to these last questions and answers. 
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By Mr. 'vVard: On the ground that they tend to disprove agency. 
. . 
By the Court: Mr. Ward, don't you think when this court tells 
this jury that they cannot consider that for that purpose that that 
would cure it? 
By Mr. Shrader: No, sir. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Mr. Lamb, on the occasion of the visit of Mr. Johnson was 
anything said about the details of his return trip from Bedford? 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. 'vVard: I object to that question and answer on 
page 87 } the same grounds and note an exception for the reasons 
stated. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. At the time you lent him the license plates did you give him 
a paper writing. 
A. Yes, sir, I gave him a permit for the tags, to use the tags. 
Q. On what day? 
A. That ,,vas on Saturday evening. 
Q. ·when was he permitted to use them? 
A. On the 21st of May. 
Q. On Sunday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have any reason to believe at that time that there 
was anything irregular or improper about your lending him -the 
license tags? 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Ward: We have no questions to ask this witness. 
By the Court: .Gentlemen of the Jury, you cannot consider any 
· of the evidence of this witness as tending to show that Bernard 
Johnson was not the agent operating and controlling the car for 
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the Driver's Sales & Service and Mrs. Driver. You understand 
that? 
By Mr. Williams: We note an exception, of course, to your 
Honor's ruling. 
page 88 ~ The witness, W. M. SCHWAB, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Mr. Schwab, are you connected with Driver's Sales & Service? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In what capacity? 
A. Manager. 
Q. I believe you are a son-in-law of Mrs. Driver. 
A. I am. 
Q. Were you manager of that organization in last May? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Prior to May 21st did you know Mr. Bernard Johnson? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You had never seen him to your knowledge before that? 
A. Which day? 
Q. May 21st, the day of the accidept. 
A. I saw him on the day before the accident. 
Q. Had you ever seen him to your knowledge prior to that day? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had anything come to your attention showing, or tending to 
show that Mr. Johnson was not physically or mentally capable of 
driving that car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You heard me read to Mr. Lamb who preceded you on the 
witness stand· the allegations of the notice of motion 
page 89 ~ concerning Mr. Johnson's mental and physical condition. 
Did you have any notice of any such condition at that 
time? 
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A. No, sir.· 
Q. Or of anything that would make it probable or· likely that he 
would have an accident if he undertook to drive an automobile? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I believe you saw Mr. Johnson for the first time on Saturday, 
May 20th? 
A. To my knowledge, yes, sir. 
Q. What was the occasion of your seeing him then? 
A. Mr. Lamb brought him in and asked about the use of the tags. 
Q. Whose use? 
A. Mr. Johnson's use. 
By Mr. Shrader: Your Honor· please, we object to that question 
and answer for the reasons previously stated. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. For what purpose was he to use the tags? 
A. To bring Mr. Johnson's car to Waynesboro. 
By Mr. Shrader: Objected to for the same reasons. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Was there any understanding or agreement between you 
about this trade-in ? 
A. No, sir., 
By Mr. Ward: Objected to and excepted to for the reasons 
stated. 
page 90 ~ By Mr. Williams: 
Q. You lent him the tags? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And gave him a permit on the usual form provided by the 
State Highway Commission? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear anything more about this trip until you heard 
of the accident? 
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A. No, sir. 
By· Mr. Ward. Objection and exception for the reasons stated. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Was there any conversation between you concerning the de-
. tails of the return trip? 
A. No, sir. 
By ~r. Ward: Objection and exception for the reasons stated. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. To what extent, if any, did your company have any intere_st 
in the trip that Mr. Johnson was about to make? 
By Mr. Shrader: Objection and exception for the reasons stated. 
A. In the hope that we would trade him an automobile. 
Q. But nothing beyond that hope? 
· A. No, sir. 
By the Court : Gentlemen of the Jury, I give you the same in-
struction; that the evidence of this witness, so far as 
page 91 ~ it tends to show, or shows any detail of the agency of 
Bernard Johnson for Mrs. Driver, trading as the Driver's 
Sales & Service, and also, so far as it might show or tend to show 
his failure to operate and control that car under their control, is not 
to be considered by you. For all other purposes you may consider 
the evidence of this witness, as you may consider the evidence of 
the preceding witness, .Mr. Lamb, for all other purposes. 
By Mr. Williams: We note a similar exception, if your Honor 
please. Now, the defendant, Mrs. Gertrude Robson Driver, rests, 
and we should like, in the absence of the jury, to renew our motion 
formerly made. 
By the Court : You are simply renewing the motion on behalf 
of Mrs. Driver, trading as Drivers Sales & Service? 
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By Mr. Williams: Yes, sir. 
By the Court : Renewing the same motion on the same grounds? 
By Mr. ·wmiams: That there is no evidence to show actionable 
negligence or causal connection--
By the Court : You mean so far as the agency in the operation 
and control is concerned? 
page 92 } By Mr .. Williams: Perhaps the jury had better retire. 
Note : ( The jury retires from the court room.) 
By Mr. Williams: Our motion is, if your Honor please, that the 
evidence be stricken as to the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, 
on the ground that it fails to reveal any actionable negligence as to 
her, and that it fails to reveal the relationship of master and 
servant between them at the time of the injury. In this connection 
we think it proper to say, even on your Honor's ruling under 6126, 
there is before this court and jury the evidence of Mr. Johnson, to 
whom 6126 has no application, which reveals the true situation, and 
that situation is, as stated in the notice of motion, that the auto.-
mobile was not owned by Mrs. Driver and that the mission of the 
automobile, its purpose during the trip in which this accident hap-
pened, was solely for the purpose of the operator; that even grant-
ing under your Hon<!>r's ruling under 6126, agency is established-
that is, relationship of master and servant, nevertheless, and not-
withstanding, there must exist the further fact that at the time of 
the alleged injury the servant or the person then in the master's 
employ was engaged in the furtherance of the master's business. 
That fact does not appear. In fact the contrary appears, namely 
that that agent, if he be an agent, or servant, was 
page 93 } attending solely to his own business, consequently, that 
even though under your Honor's ruling relationship of 
master and servant exists, the necessary facts are not proved in this 
case that the agent at the time of the injury· was engaged in the 
furtherance of the master's business or within the scop~ of his 
employ. 
By the Court: The motion is respectfully overruled. 
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By Mr. Williams : We note an exception. 
Note: (At this point court was adjourned from 12 :30 9'dock 
until 2 :00 o'clock of the same day.) · 
Note: ( Court met pltrsuant to adjournment at 2 :00 o'clock 
P.M. 
By Mr. Williams : The motion we make is at this stage to file 
the necessary affidavit before the case goes to the jury. 
By the Court: I can't allow that now. I think that it is too late. 
That very motion was made in the Vandergrift case, 158 Va., and 
denied at that time. That motion will have to be respectfully over-
ruled. 
By Mr. Williams: I except. I was actuated in that by this 
thought : Our pos~tion is, of course--
page 94 ~ By the Court (interposing) : Suppose we go into this 
room. 
Note: (The foregoing motion hav_ing been fully argued in 
chambers by both counsel for defendant and counsel for the plain-
tiff, the court still adhered to its ruling previously made on said 
motion.) 
page 95 ~ INSTRUCTIONS. 
INSTRUCTION No. 1. DRAWN BY THE CouRT AND G1vEN IN LIEU 
OF PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION No 1. (No OBJECTION): 
"T.he Court tells the jury, that in determining the weight to be 
given to the testimony of different witnesses in this case, the jury 
are authorized to consider the relationship of the witnesses to the 
parties, if the same is proved; their interest, if any, in the result of 
this case, their temper, feeling, or bias, if any has been shown; their · 
demeanor while testifying; their apparent intelligence, and their 
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means of information; and to give such credit to the testimony of 
such witnesses as under all the circumstances such witness seems 
to be entitled to." 
PLAINTIFF's INSTRUCTION No 2. (GRANTED As OFFERED-
No OBJCECTION) : 
"The Court instructs the Jury that on the occasion complained 
of in plaintiff's motion for judgment, jt was Bernard Johnson's 
duty to use ordinary care in the operation of the said Plymouth 
automobile, that is, such care as an average prudent man would use 
under the same circumstances. And if the Jury believe. from the 
evidence that on the occasion complained of in plaintiff's motion for 
judgment, Bernard Johnson did not use ordinary care in the opera-
tion of said Plymouth automobile and that his failure to use ordi-
nary care was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, then they 
shall find their verdict against both defendants, Bernard. Johnson 
and Gert,rude Robson Driver, trading as Drivers Sales and Se1~vice." 
page 96 ~ By Mr. Williams: Instruction No. 3 goes into the 
question of preponderance and gives the jury the right 
to weigh the facts and circumstances, but in view of what we have 
just recited about the evidence as to the man's condition I don't 
know that any serious point could be made about a direct conflict 
of testimony as to that. Mr. Ward may have views, of course, to 
the contrary, but it does not seem to me that there is enough 
conflict on the salient issue in the case about this accident happening 
suddenly, or being taken suddenly with this attack, to justify an 
instruction on preponderance of evidence and whether one side 
outweighs the other. 
By Mr. Ward: The whole thing is whether Bernard Johnson 
had probable cause to believe that he would probably faint or had 
some appreciable chance of fainting if he drove this car, and there 
is no evidence here beyond a reasonable doubt but his own testimony 
and what the plaintiff and her witnesses have testified and it is 
certainly a question for the jury as to where the preponderance .lies. 
By the Court: What particularly is your objection to No. 3? 
By Mr. Williams: That there is not a conflict in the evidence 
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upon the main issue of the defendant Johnson being stricken sud-
denly with some unforseen malady. 
i 
,By the Court: You mean there is not sufficient evidence 
page 9i ~ to fustify reasonably believing otherwise than he lost 
control through no fault of his? 
~y Mr. \Villiams: That expresses my idea better than I have 
done. 
By Mr. Franklin: Further objection to No. 3 is that "even in the 
slightest degree." I think that is misleading to the jury. 
By the Court: That struck me as being the real objection, re-
spectfully speaking. 
By Mr. 'vVard: I don't w
1
ant any error in this case and I am 
willing for your Honor to change it a little bit. 
PLAINTIFF's INSTRUCTION No. 3, As OFFERED AND REFUSED: 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff to prove her case, yet this does not require her to prove 
her case beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and therefore, if after the Jury considers all evidence 
in this case, including all circumstances as well as direct testimony, 
they believe from such circumstances and direct evidence that the 
evidence in favor of the plaintiff out-weighs that of the defendants, 
even in the slightest degree, then. this requirement as to the burden 
of proof is 'fully met and the Jury should find for the plaintiff." 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION No. 3, AS OFFERED AND REFUSED: 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the burden of 
·page 98 ~ proof is on the plaintiff to prove her case, yet this does 
not require her to prove her case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but only by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore, 
if after the Jury considers all evidence in this. case, including all 
circumstances as well as direct testimony, they believe from such 
circumstances and direct evidence that the evidence in favor of the 
plaintiff out-weighs that of the defendants, then this requirernen~ as 
to the burden of proof is fully met and the Jury should find for 
the plaintiff." 
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PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION No. 4. (GRANTED-No OBJECTION}: 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they find for the plaintiff, 
they should allow her such sum as they believe from·, the evidence 
will compensate her for the injuries received; and in estimating the 
plaintiff's injuries, the Jury may take into consideration the mental 
and physical pain, if any, the reasonable value of the time lost from 
work, if any, the expenses, if any, incidental to attempts to effect 
a cure or lessen the amount of injury; and in considering what sum, 
if any, should be awarded to plaintiff on account of her disfigure-
ment, the Jury may take into consideration her age and physical 
condition and the probable duration of her life, but the Jury cannot 
give the plaintiff an amount exceeding the amount asked for in 
plaintiff's motion for judgment." 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION "X"-(GRANTED-NO OBJECTION): 
"The court instructs the jury that an unavoidable accident is such 
an occurrence as under the circumstances could not have 
page 99 ~ forseen or anticipated in the exercise of ordinary care. 
And if the jury believe from the evidence that this acci-
. dent was caused by the defendant, Bernard Johnson, fainting or 
losing consciousness and that such fainting or loss of consciousness 
could not reasonably be foreseen, then the accident was an unavoid-
able accident and the jury' should find for the defendants." 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION "Y" -(REFUSED-EXCEPTION) : 
"The Court instructs the jury that unless they believe from the 
evidence that the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, knew, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known on Mav 20, 
1939, that the defendant Johnson was physically or mentally"' unfit 
to drive a car, they must find for the defendant, Gertrude Robson 
Driver." 
By Mr. Ward: "The plaintiff, by counsel, objects to instruction 
'Y' on the ground that it in ef(ect directs a verdict for.the defendant, 
Gertrude Robson Driver, even though she was operating and con-
trolling said Plymouth automobile by and through Bernard Johnson 
at the time of the accident. 
"As has been said, two separate and distinct causes of action are 
contained in plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment. One cause 
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of action is based on the fact that Mrs. Driver was operating and 
controlling said Plymouth automobile fJy and through Bernard 
Johnson, at the time of the accident and at all times mentioned 
therein. Therefore, under this count Mrs. Driver would be liable 
for damages if plaintiff's injuries proximately resulted from negli-
gence on Bernard Johnson's part whether or not Bernard 
page 100 ~Johnson was incompetent and whether or not Mrs. Driver 
knew ~e was incompetent. 
"The other count alleges that Bernard Johnson was incompetent 
· and that Mrs. · Driver knew this. If the allegations of this count 
had been proved, Mrs. Driver would have been liable even though 
she had not operated and controled the automobile in question by 
and through Bernard Johnson. But there is no evidence that Mrs. 
Driver knew Bernard Johnson was incompetent and, as I ·have 
already stated, I am not relying on this count and have no objection 
to it being stricken from the notice of motion for judgment, or, I 
have no objection to this instruction 'Y' if it is made to apply only 
to the count which alleges that Mrs. Driver knew Bernard Johnson 
was incompetent." · 
By Mr. Williams: I want to note my exceptions. The defendant, 
Gertrude Robson Driver, excepts to the action of the court in refus-
ing to give the instruction "Y" on the ground that under the issue 
made by the allegation of plaintiff's notice of motion, of which the 
knowledge of physical infirmities was an essential part, the defend-
ant is entitled to go to the jury on the question of knowledge of 
the alleged physical and mental infirmities of the defendant Johnson. 
By Mr. Ward: The plaintiff, by counsel, renews its offer to have 
the Judge tell the jury that there is no evidence that Mrs. Driver 
knew or had any reasonable cause to believe that Bernard 
page 101 n ohnson was subject to fainting spells. If Mr. Williams 
so desires it I have no objection to the Judge telling the 
Jury that there is no evidence in this case that Mrs. Driver, or any 
of her agents, servants or employees, knew, or had any reasonable 
cause to believe that Bernard Johnson would very likely faint. 
By Mr. Williams: I mai<e no such request. 
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page 102~ CERTIFICATE. 
I, Edward Meeks, Judge of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, 
Virginia, who presided over the foregoing trial of Dorothy Brooks 
versus Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as Driver's Sales and 
Service, and Bernard Johnson, in said court, at Amherst, Virginia, 
on October 25th, 1939, do certify that the foregoing is a true and 
correct copy and report of the evidence, all of the instructions 
offered, amended, granted and refused by the court, the opinion of 
the Court and other incidents of the said trial of the said cause~ 
with the objections and exceptions of the respective parties as 
therein set forth. 
And I do further certify that the attorney for the plaintiff, 
Dorothy Brooks, had reasonable notice, in writing, given by counsel 
for the defendant, Gertrude Robson Driver, of the time and place 
when the foregoing report of the testimony, instructions, excep-
tions and other incidents .of the trial would be tendered and pre-
sented to the undersigned for si_gnature and authentication. 
Given under my hand this 18th day of May, 1940, within sixty 
days after the entry of the final judgment in said cause. 
EDWARD MEEKS, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County, Virginia. 
page 103 ~ I, Wm. E. Sandidge, Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing 
report of the testimony, instructions, exceptions and other incidents 
of the. trial in the case of Dorothy Brooks versus Gertrude Robson 
Driver, trading as Driver's Sales and Service, and Bernard Johnson, 
all of which have been authenticated by the Judge of said court, 
were lodged and filed with me as Clerk of the said court on the 18th 
day of May, 1940. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
~mherst County, Virginia. 
I, vV. E. Sandidge, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Amherst 
County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a tr~ 
transcript of the record of the case of Dorothy Brooks plaintiff, 
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v. Gertrude Robson Driver, trading as Driver's Sales and Service, 
and Bernard Johnson, defendants, and I further certify that notices 
required by Virginia Code, Section 6253 and Section 6339 were 
duly given, as appears by paper writings filed with the record of 
said case, service whereof is accepted by counsel for Dorothy 
Brooks. 
The Clerk's fee for making this transcript is $5.00. 
Given under by hand this 18th day of May, 1940. 
A Copy-Teste: 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County, Virginia .. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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